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THE INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY
DOCTRINE AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL
BENEFIT MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY:
A PROPOSED EXCEPTION
TO THE COPPERWELD HOLDING*
I. INTRODUCTION
Anne has just entered her doctor's office for an appointment. After
examining Anne, the physician determines that Anne is in need of medication
to improve her health. The physician promptly fills out a prescription form and
hands it to Anne. Upon leaving the doctor's office, Anne drives to a nearby
pharmacy to have the prescription filled. Anne's health insurance company has
provided her with a "pharmacy card" to present to the pharmacist. As far as
Anne is concerned, this card simply means she has to pay less for her
medication, and her insurance company will pay the difference.' Anne pays her
portion of the payment due and leaves with her prescription in hand.
In the above hypothetical, it may appear that Anne has benefited both from
a physician's expertise and an insurance company which is saving her money.
What Anne may not realize is that her physician very likely had little discretion
in choosing which drug to prescribe for her condition. Thus, while Anne may
think that her doctor evaluated her condition and then objectively chose a
medication for her, this may not be the case. Instead, the company issuing
Anne her pharmacy card may exercise some control over which medications the
doctor prescribes. 2 Further, because this pharmacy card company may be
owned by a drug manufacturer, the drug manufacturer itself often possesses the
. This note is dedicated to the memory of my mother, Myrle Jeanette Barber (1927-1996),
whose love and support were always a constant source of strength. There is truly no love like that
of a mother. It is comforting to know that the lives of those departed live forever in the memories
of those whose lives they touched. "But you, man of God, flee from all this, and pursue
righteousness, godliness, faith, love, endurance and gentleness. Fight the good fight of the faith.
Take hold of the eternal life to which you were called .... " T i mothy 6:11-12 (New International
Version).
1. Generally, the amount of a healthcare bill for which the patient, or insured, is responsible
is referred to as the patient's "co-pay." Andrew S. Krulwich, The Response to Health Care Reform
by the Pharmaceutical Industry, 50 FOOD & DRUO L.J. 1, 2 (1995).
2. Pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs), which manage pharmaceutical costs for
health insurance plans, generally cover only selected drugs. Id. A physician is then encouraged to
prescribe one of these selected drugs to a patient covered by the PBM to ensure insurance payment.
Id. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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power to ensure that its own pharmaceuticals are prescribed. Thus, the above
scenario illustrates a major problem facing the pharmaceutical industry. Drug
manufacturers, by acquiring companies controlling disbursement of
pharmaceuticals, possess the ability to conspire with those companies to hinder
competition and, ultimately, harm consumers.
Drug manufacturers did not always possess the ability to control when their
drugs are prescribed. This ability emerged as the healthcare industry shifted
towards managed healthcare.3  Managed healthcare operates on the premise
that if a third party, such as a health maintenance organization (HMO),4
manages the care of a patient through employment of physicians, costs will be
contained while quality will increase.' This concept has further developed to
encompass not only medical care in a clinic or hospital setting, but
pharmaceutical care as well. 6 As a result, insurance companies wishing to
manage pharmaceutical costs now receive assistance from pharmacy benefit
management companies (PBMs).
PBMs are now dominant in the health care industry.' PBMs control costs
in much the same manner as other managed healthcare entities, such as HMOs
3. Gordon K. MacLeod, An Overview of Managed Health Care, in THE MANAGED CARE
HANDBOOK 3 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993). By 1992, over one million Americans were
enrolled in managed health care plans. Id. Further, the number of employees in Preferred Provider
Organizations increased from zero in the late 1970's to over 37 million by December 1991. Id.
Much of this growth is attributable to the HMO Act of 1973, which facilitated growth in medical
plans by financing them with grants, contracts and loans. Id. at 4. As a result, it is now estimated
that approximately 100 million people, including dependents of enrollees, are currently enrolled in
some form of managed care plan. Id. at 6.
4. An HMO collects premiums from its subscribers and, in return, provides medical services
through its own employed physicians. MICHAEL G. MACDONALD ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE §7.02[21 (1995). Because the physicians are employed by the HMO, usually for
an agreed-upon salary, the physician has less incentive to authorize unnecessary tests and procedures.
Id.
5. MacLeod, supra note 3, at 5. The HMO Act of 1973 received support because it was
assumed that HMO's could lower costs and enhance medical care competition without the
government getting involved. Id. See also Bruce N. Kuhlik, The FDA's Regulation of
Pharmaceutical Communications in the Context of Managed Care: A Suggested Approach, 50 FOOD
& DRUG L.J. 23, 24 (1995) (pointing out that "[tihe principal elements of any managed care system
are arrangements with selected providers to fumish covered services to enrollees and guidelines for
care to ensure quality and control utilization"); MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 4, § 7.0212] (noting
that managed care includes any attempt to control the utilization of healthcare).
6. Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 27-28. "In 1993, the number of outpatient prescriptions under some
form of managed care surpassed the number of unmanaged prescriptions for the first time." Id. at
28.
7. Alex Barnum, Behind the $4 Billion Drug Deal, S.F. CHRON., July 12, 1994, at BI (stating
that PBMs control almost half of the prescription drug market and that experts predict this share will
increase to 90% by the year 2000).
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or preferred provider organizations (PPOs).5 Typically, a PBM will contract
with pharmaceutical manufacturers that agree to provide their drugs at a
discounted rate to the PBM's subscribers or patients.9 Drug manufacturers are
willing to provide these drug discounts in exchange for guarantees that the PBM
will encourage physicians and patients to use those drugs over rival
manufacturers' drugs." Therefore, in the above scenario, Anne's pharmacy
card indicates that she is a subscriber of a PBM. Most likely, her PBM
provided her physician with a list of drugs, known as a formulary," which the
physician is to use when selecting a medication to prescribe for Anne. 2 As
a result, Anne paid a lower price for her medication than if the PBM had not
existed. 3 In an ideal situation, the PBM has selected only the "best" drugs for
its formulary, 4 so Anne's health has not been compromised in the name of
cost-savings. Unfortunately, however, many "less than ideal" situations
involving PBMs are emerging, such as that of drug manufacturers purchasing
PBMs and subsequently controlling which drugs achieve formulary placement.
8. In a PPO, physicians join together and contract with insurance companies or businesses to
provide medical serv'ices. MACDONALD ET AL., supra note 4, § 7.02[2]. The beneficiary of a PPO
is then provided services at a discount as long as one of the "preferred" physicians is utilized. Id.
These arrangements are most successful when a surplus of physicians exists. Id.
9. Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R. Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs is Revolutionizing the
Drug Industry: Managed Pharmaceutical Care and Vertical Integration of Drug Makers and PBMs
Promise Benefits, But Also Harbor Lurking Liability, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 177, 178 (1995)
(explaining that PBMs negotiate discounts from drug manufacturers and then guarantee to purchase
drugs in volume).
10. Thomas M. Burton & Elyse Tanouye, Eli Lilly's Planned Purchase of PCS May be Tied
to Strict Conditions by FTC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1994, at A3 (stating that pharmaceutical
manufacturers either give PBMs better discounts or simply buy the PBMs to ensure preferential
status for their drugs). See also Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2-4 (noting that drug manufacturers
exchange price losses resulting from offering discounts for a guaranteed high volume of sales).
11. A formulary is a list of drugs that the PBM has compiled to indicate those drugs that should
be prescribed. Essentially, the drugs on the formulary are those the PBM was able to purchase from
the drug manufacturers via volume discounts and rebates. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying
text.
12. Darlene Superville, Eli Lilly Accepts Restrictions on Takeover of PCS, Associated Press,
Nov. 3, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS, at *1 (explaining that the PBMs require
participating doctors to select drugs for their patients from the PBM's formulary); Barnum, supra
note 7, at BI (noting that doctors are strongly urged to use only formulary drugs).
13. Retail Drug Stores Support FTC Decision to Review Merck, SmithKline Acquisitions, PR
Newswire, Nov. 15, 1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS, at *1 [hereinafter Retail
Drug] (noting that the reason insurance companies hire PBMs is to help control drug costs).
14. In creating a formulary, a PBM selects each drug by examining the drug's price,
effectiveness, safety, and side effects. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 3. Therefore, the "best" drug
is the one that is the most effective and the most reasonably priced. Under this theory, the goal of
any formulary should be to provide quality drugs at an affordable price; a low-priced drug that is
not medically effective should not be chosen. See infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
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While it would seem that PBMs provide an advantage for all parties
involved, a recent practice has created a disturbing trend. Drug manufacturers
have begun to see the benefits of further aligning with PBMs.' 5 As a result,
three major pharmaceutical manufacturers acquired PBMs in a period of just
eighteen months.' 6 In 1993, Merck & Company acquired Medco Containment
Services for $6.6 billion.'7  In 1994, SmithKline Beecham purchased
Diversified Pharmaceutical Services for $2.3 billion.'" Also in 1994, Eli Lilly
& Company purchased PCS Health Systems for $4 billion. 9 In theory, PBMs
are supposed to contract with a diverse number of drug manufacturers, thus
ensuring that the PBMs select only the best and most cost-effective drugs to
offer to their subscribers.' However, once a PBM is owned by a single drug
manufacturer, that manufacturer has great potential to exert control over the
PBM.2" This situation results in the PBM selecting its parent company's drugs
simply because the parent company requires it to do so, which could
compromise consumers' health and safety, and ultimately lead to higher priced
pharmaceuticals being selected.' Therefore, the acquisitions by Merck,
SmithKline and Lilly raise serious questions about whether these new alliances
15. Several theories exist concerning why drug manufacturers are buying PBMs. The most
prevalent theory is that drug manufacturers want to find out which drugs certain patients are taking
so that the manufacturer can exert its power to switch those prescriptions to its own drugs. Burton
& Tanouye, supra note 10, at A3. Others theorize that drug manufacturers simply want to ensure
access to the market for their own new drugs. U.S. FTC "Unlikely" to Curb PBM Strategies,
MARKETLETTER, Nov. 21, 1994, at *1, available in 1994 WL 2792994 [hereinafter PBM
Strategies]. Still others opine that drug manufacturers have realized how much power PBMs have,
and the manufacturers are simply trying to regain control. Barnum, supra note 7, at BI.
16. These acquisitions are said to be only one of several changes drug manufacturers plan to
make. The ultimate goal is to convert the drug manufacturer into a "disease-management" company,
meaning the manufacturer will take on the responsibility of managing more aspects of healthcare.
Barnum, supra note 7, at Bl. For example, under a disease-management regime, a drug
manufacturer would agree to manage all of the health care costs for a specific illness. Id. The
illness chosen is usually one that is normally treated with pharmaceuticals, such as diabetes. Id.
In return for managing the disease, the manufacturer receives a set fee, thereby ensuring the
manufacturer a profit only if its costs do not exceed the previously set fee. Id. For a detailed
discussion of these acquisitions and the FTC's response to them, see infra notes 67-9.7 and
accompanying text.
17. Barnum, supra note 7, at Bl. Merck is the largest pharmaceutical company in the world.
Id. Medco both manages the costs of pharmaceuticals and runs a mail-order drug business. Id.
18. Id. Diversified was previously owned by United HealthCare, a Minnesota-based cor-
porstion that owns and manages several HMOs. Id. See also Superville, supra note 12, at *2.
19. Barnum, supra note 7, at Bl. PCS is considered the leading PBM in the industry. Id.
20. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2-3.
21. The drug manufacturer may, for example, force its PBM subsidiary to redesign its
formulary to include more of the parent company's drugs. Barnum, supra note 7, at Bl. For a
discussion of the concerns generated by these acquisitions, see infra notes 75-86 and accompanying
text.
22. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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may violate antitrust laws.' Unfortunately, the courts have construed federal
antitrust statutes so that these merged companies are largely insulated from
antitrust liability.
Currently, several federal antitrust statutes exist to discourage all types of
businesses from engaging in anticompetitive activity.2 However, drug
manufacturers which merge with PBMs are almost always beyond the reach of
these statutes because each statute requires that a company meet very specific
criteria before the company is found to violate the antitrust statute.Y First,
section 7 of the Clayton Act was created to provide some guidance over
vertical mergers27 like the ones involved here. However, the Supreme Court
has held that private plaintiffs, unlike the government, have no standing to
challenge a vertical merger.' Although the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)' always has standing to challenge mergers,' once the FTC has given
23. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
24. Four main statutes govern anti-competitive activity. First, the Clayton Act applies when
one company purchases the stock of another company with the intent to reduce competition or create
a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Second, the Federal Trade Commission Act created the FTC
and granted the FTC power to declare unfair competition as unlawful. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45 (1994).
Third, § 2 of the Sherman Act applies to any company which attempts to exercise monopoly power
over its competitors. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Fourth, § 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits companies
from contracting or conspiring in restraint of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). See infra notes 98-159
and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 98-159 and accompanying text.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The Act provides in pertinent part:
No person engaged in commerce . . . shall acquire ...the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital ... of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
27. A vertical merger is one in which different levels of the same industry merge to form one
company. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 16. For example, if a company that manufactures widgets
acquires a company that distributes those widgets, a vertical merger has taken place. Both the
manufacturer and the distributor are involved in the same industry, but are involved at different
levels. See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 18 (1978). When two markets in
the same manufacturing chain link, vertical integration has occurred. Id. This usually involves two
firms that have a supplier/customer relationship. Id.
28. Cargill v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). Cargill held that a plaintiff "must
allege threatened loss or damage 'of the type the antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that
flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful.'" Id. at 113 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). See infra notes 99-110 and accompanying
text.
29. The Federal Trade Commission was created by the Federal Trade Commission Act, and was
granted the authority to prevent persons or organizations from engaging in "unfair methods of
competition." 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45 (1994). Section 41 of the Act states that "[a] commission is
created and established, to be known as the Federal Trade Commission . . . ." Id. § 41.
30. Burton & Tanouye, supra note 10, at *2 (noting that, technically, the FTC could challenge
a merger years after it takes place).
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its approval to a merger, as it has to the drug manufacturer/PBM mergers, it is
highly unlikely that the FTC will later challenge the merger under any of the
existing statutes.3 The second statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act
(FTC Act),32 contains broad language which encompasses a substantial amount
of anticompetitive activity. Unfortunately, courts have been reluctant to review
actions based upon the FTC Act, especially when the FTC has not given notice
as to what actions are proscribed under the Act.33 Thirdly, section 2 of the
Sherman Act' requires that a company have monopoly power and that it tries
to exercise that power.35 While the PBM industry is now dominated by those
PBMs that have merged with drug manufacturers, none of the three merged
companies alone has the market power to meet this monopoly criteria.3
The final possible deterrent of unfair competition is section 1 of the
Sherman Act,37 which prohibits "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade. "' While this would
seem to be the appropriate statute to use in deterring unfair competition by drug
manufacturers that have merged with PBMs, this statute is inapplicable to the
companies because of the Supreme Court's holding in Coppenveld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp.39  In Copperweld, the Court repudiated the
previously used intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,' which stated that a parent
company and its wholly-owned subsidiary could conceivably conspire in restraint
of trade.4' Instead, the Court decided that because a conspiracy requires two
entities in law, such merged companies could not conspire since they legally
31. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The Act declares "[uinfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce" unlawful. Id. The Act also empowers the FTC to prevent organizations from using
such methods of competition by enabling the FTC to enter a cease and desist order. Id.
33. See infra notes 111-39 and accompanying text.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Act states that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty . . ." Id.
35. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
38. Id.
39. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
40. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948);
United Stptes v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). For a critical analysis of these cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 164-85.
41. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769. The Court noted that an agreement to follow a single
company's policy "does not raise the antitrust dangers that § 1 was designed to police." Id. The
Court reasoned that there existed a unity of interest among the parent and its subsidiary; therefore,
it was to be viewed as a single entity. Id. at 771.
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only constituted one entity.4 2 Thus, these newly merged drug manufacturers
and PBMs are left with little or no incentive to avoid unfair competition.
This Note will analyze the current antitrust statutes in effect and discuss
why these laws are essentially ineffective weapons to enforce possible violations
by drug manufacturers that have merged with PBMs. This Note will focus on
the gap left in antitrust law as a result of the Supreme Court abandoning the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. Additionally, this Note proposes that the
Court create an exception to the Copperweld holding which would allow the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine to apply when merged companies meet
specific criteria. Thus, instead of a blanket rule declaring that a parent company
and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire, the exception would, in limited
situations, allow just the opposite finding. This exception would fill the gap left
by Copperweld and would allow courts to apply the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine in situations where a company has great incentive to engage in unfair
competition with little threat of criminal prosecution. As a result, the newly
merged companies in the PBM industry would be deterred from unfair
competition in restraint of trade.
Section II of this Note will discuss the background of managed pharmacy
care and explain the relationship PBMs have with drug manufacturers, as well
as the recent trend of drug manufacturers merging with PBMs.43 Section II
will also discuss the FTC's response to these mergers. " Section III will
explain how the four main federal antitrust statutes are inadequate to deal with
these mergers, emphasizing section 1 of the Sherman Act and the possibility of
the merged companies conspiring in restraint of trade.4" Next, Section IV will
examine the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine and its demise in Copperweld.4
Finally, Section V will propose that the Supreme Court create an exception to
the Copperweld holding to allow application of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine. This exception would only apply in limited situations where a parent
corporation and its subsidiary have such opposing goals that illegal competition
is highly likely and where the demand for the merged companies' product is
inelastic.47
42. Id.
43. See infra notes 48-86 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 87-97 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 98-159 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 160-246 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 247-87 and accompanying text.
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II. BACKGROUND OF MANAGED PHARMACY CARE
A. How PBMs Operate
Pharmaceutical managed care operates under the same premise as any other
area of managed healthcare: the managed care organization will try to reduce
costs for its subscribers while providing them with quality care. 48 The trend
towards including pharmacy benefits in managed care occurred largely because
of the increasing cost of pharmaceuticals.49 Because individual insurers and
managed healthcare entities want to control these costs, yet do not have the
expertise to make decisions concerning pharmaceuticals, they contract with
PBMs to actually purchase pharmaceuticals for their subscribers. 5 0
PBMs obtain pharmaceuticals at a discount using a two-step process. First,
the PBM creates a drug formulary; 5' second, the PBM secures volume
discounts from drug manufacturers that want their drugs to be placed on the
formulary. 52 A formulary is "a dynamic, comprehensive list of drugs designed
to direct physicians to prescribe the most cost-effective medications. "' In
determining whether a drug will be placed on the formulary, a PBM examines
a drug's price, effectiveness, and safety, as well as a number of other factors.5 4
1
48. Henry F. Blissenbach, Pharmaceutical Services in Managed Care, in THE MANAGED
HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK 142-43 (Peter R. Kongstvedt ed., 2d ed. 1993) (stating that a PBM's
"responsibility is to contain the cost of. . . medicines without depriving individuals of necessary
medicines"). Further, the goal of managed healthcare is to provide quality medical care at prices
which are competitive. MacLeod, supra note 3, at 8.
49. Robert Marks, Managed Care Perspectives, MANAGED CARE WK., Dec. 5, 1994, at 1
(stating that from 1980 to 1990, prescription drug prices increased 152%, white during the same
time the general inflation rate rose only 58%; further, prescription cost increases have outpaced
other health services costs). See also Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that expenditures for
pharmaceuticals increased 15% in 1993, compared to only an 8% increase in overall employer
healthcare costs). Furthermore, one-third of all health benefits for retirees are now consumed by
prescription drug costs. Id.
50. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2. A PBM may serve more than one health insurance plan and
may create a slightly different formulary for each plan. Id.
51. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
53. Blissenbach, supra note 48, at 152. See also Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that
"formularies ... are lists of 'preferred' drugs"); Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 178 (noting that
"PBMs promote the medications on their formularies by providing physicians and pharmacists with
information about their efficacy and cost relative to other comparable medications"). A hypothetical
formulary might require that for diabetic patients, the physician must prescribe Brand X of insulin
rather than Brand Y or Z. Thus, Brand X is the "preferred" insulin. The formulary would then go
on to list a preferred drug for each therapeutic category.
54. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 3 (listing other factors as the possible side effects of a drug and
how the drug fares in comparison to other medications). Some drugs are typically not included in
formularies, such as those which are "experimental or unproven... or [those] that are not generally
accepted by the medical community as a standard of care." Blissenbach, supra note 48, at 144.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1 [1996], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol31/iss1/9
1996] INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE 317
The obvious result of a formulary is that providers prescribe drugs on the
formulary more often than those not on the formulary," especially since a
PBM usually buys only one drug out of a group of similar, competing drugs.56
Subscribers of health plans using a PBM are also encouraged, and often
required, to use drugs on the formulary.57 The formulary results in lower
overall pharmaceutical expenditures because it controls which drugs a doctor
will prescribe to patients.' Optimally, the formulary will include the most
clinically effective and cost effective drugs and will result in those drugs being
prescribed. 9
Because PBMs are effective in controlling costs and have become so
prominent in the healthcare industry, they now represent a huge potential market
Furthermore, to be successful, a drug formulary must meet three criteria: first, "[it must reflect
the practice of medicine in the community"; second, "[it must be responsive to the therapeutic
needs of the physicians"; and third, "[ilt must be representative of cost-effective therapy." Id. at
152.
55. See Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that a PBM will incorporate many types of
incentives to encourage use of the formulary drug). The formulary may also require physicians to
use formulary drugs by threatening to discontinue contracting with the physician. Id. The more
common method of ensuring formulary compliance is through incentive programs. Id. For
example, a PBM may pay pharmacists bonus fees whenever they convince a physician to prescribe
a formulary drug. Id. See aLso Blissenbach, supra note 48, at 154 (suggesting that placement on
a formulary "serves as an endorsement for the [drug]" and that formulary placement results in a
spillover effect through which "physicians will tend to prescribe formulary products for all their
patients, not just those belonging to the HMO"); Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 29 (noting that a
pharmacist might notify a physician that the drug he or she prescribed is not on the formulary and
subsequently convince the physician to prescribe the formulary drug instead).
56. Anne E. Tergesen, Drug Makers Probed: FTC Looking Into Possible Antitrust, REC.
N.N.J., June 22, 1994, at CI. To ensure competitiveness with other PBMs, a PBM must "seek out
the best drug at the lowest price." Id.
57. For example, a subscriber may be required to have his or her prescription filled at a
"network pharmacy" with which the PBM has contracted to provide the drugs on the formulary at
the agreed-upon discounted price. Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 178. Similarly, unless a
physician receives prior authorization from the PBM, the PBM may refuse to pay for a prescription
if it is not on the formulary. Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 30. Lastly, the patient's portion of the
pharmaceutical fee may be higher if the drug prescribed is not on the formulary. Krulwich, supra
note 1, at 2.
58. Blissenbach, supra note 48, at 152 (stating that the use of a drug formulary can result in
a. savings of 10% or more on pharmaceutical costs).
59. Marks, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that absent a managed care system, either a doctor or
a pharmacist generally selects a prescription drug, and that they lack the incentive to choose
cost-effective drugs); Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 178 (stating that as a means of promoting
formulary drugs, PBM's provide physicians and pharmacists with information about each formulary
drug's effectiveness and cost in comparison with other drugs).
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for drug manufacturers.' For this reason, drug manufacturers will often go
to great lengths to have their products placed on a formulary. 6 The first and
most common tactic is for a manufacturer to offer a generous rebate to a PBM
in exchange for placement on the PBM's formulary.62 Under a simplified
rebate program, a drug manufacturer will offer a certain amount of dollars each
time one of its particular drugs is prescribed to a subscriber of the PBM.63 A
second method of ensuring placement on a formulary is for the drug
manufacturer to allow the PBM volume discounts when purchasing drugs.
6 4
Manufacturers are willing to offer the PBMs such generous rebates and
discounts because the manufacturer's drug is then made available to an almost
guaranteed market.65 However, manufacturers are now looking to alternative
methods of accessing the PBM market, such as acquiring PBMs.6
B. The Trend of Manufacturers Further Aligning With PBMs
Because drug manufacturers have realized that managed pharmaceutical care
is not going to disappear,6 7 they have begun to align further with PBMs,
60. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2 n.3. Over 100 million Americans belong to a PBM, a number
that was expected to double by the end of 1995. Marks, supra note 49, at 1. PBMs provide
benefits to over fifty percent of the insureds in the United States. Id. at 2. This is evidenced by
the fact that in 1993, nearly 50% of all prescriptions were filled under managed care plans, a
considerable rise from only 37% in 1990. Id. See also Barnum, supra note 7, at BI (noting that
in the United States, about 50 percent of the $60 billion prescription drug market is now influenced
by PBMs).
61. Marks, supra note 49, at 2 (stating that drug makers are aware of the popularity of PBMs,
and, therefore, want to ensure that they have a position on the PBM's formulary). See also Dunne
& Ryan, supra note 9, at 178 (stating that "competition is fierce" among pharmaceutical
manufacturers seeking representation on formularies); Krulwich, supra note 1, at 2-3 (suggesting
that "achieving a spot on the formulary as a preferred drug is key for pharmaceutical
manufacturers").
62. Blissenbach, supra note 48, at 153; Marks, supra note 49, at 3. Because the PBM is the
final decision-maker as to which drugs will ultimately be prescribed to health plan subscribers, the
PBM has a great deal of purchasing leverage over drug manufacturers. Dunne & Ryan, supra note
9, at 178.
63. James G. Kimball, Pharmacies Sue Over Pricing, Bus. MARKETING, Nov. 1, 1994, at *1,
available in 1994 WL 11048942. See also Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that PBMs grant
formulary status to a manufacturer's drug in exchange for discounts and rebates). This formulary
placement can help the manufacturer increase the utilization of its product. Id.
64. Marks, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that because PBMs are large volume purchasers of
drugs, they "are in a better position than consumers" to obtain discounted prices). As a result, the
drug manufacturers competing for contracts with PBMs will offer price discounts to the PBM. Id.
at 3.
65. See supra note 60.
66. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 49, at 2 (noting that drug manufacturers are seeking methods
to ensure formulary placement with PBMs); Krulwich, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that the drug
industry has reacted to PBMs by forming alliances with PBMs).
67. Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 177.
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beyond offering rebate schemes or volume discounts. 6 In a period of just two
years, three major drug manufacturers acquired the three largest PBMs in the
country.' The first such merger occurred in November of 1993, when Merck
& Company purchased Medco Containment Services for $6.6 billion. 70
SmithKline Beecham then purchased Diversified Pharmaceutical Services for
$2.3 billion in 1994.7 Following suit, Eli Lilly & Company purchased PCS
Health Systems in 1994 for a purchase price of $4 billion. 2  These three
companies now control more than eighty percent of the PBM market,' which
translates into a potential market of ninety-four million patients.74 The
dominance of these three newly merged companies has generated a continuing
concern from consumers and competitors over possible antitrust violations by the
companies' despite the fact that the FTC approved all three of the mergers. 76
The main concern focuses on the ease with which a drug manufacturer could
exert influence over its PBM subsidiary in the creation of the PBM's drug
formulary." The perceived evil is that the drug manufacturer will force the
PBM to place its drugs on the formulary, regardless of the drugs' cost or
68. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
69. Kimball, supra note 63, at *1.
70. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 3-4.
71. Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 180; Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 32.
72. Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 180; Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 32.
73. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *1; Chain Drug Stores, Consumer Groups Oppose FTC
Proposed Consent Order in Lilly/PCS Merger, PR Newswire, Dec. 8, 1994, available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS, at *3 [hereinafter Chain Drug].
74. Vertical Arrangements in Prescription Benefit Management Business Under Antitrust
Microscope, 423 FTC WATCH 3, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Vertical Arrangements].
75. Chain Drug, supra note 73, at *1 (suggestingthat the mergers "will work against the public
welfare through higher prescription prices for consumers" (quoting Ronald L. Ziegler, President &
CEO of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores)). Those familiar with the FTC claim that
competitors of Merck and SmithKline Beecham complained to the agency about the way the merged
companies were operating. Viveca Novak & Elyse Tanouye, FTC Restudies 2 Acquisitions by Drug
Firms, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1994, at A3.
76. FTC Gives Final Approval to Lilly Order, FTC Press Release, July 31, 1995, available in
WESTLAW, 1995 WL 451033 [hereinafter Final Approval]. One antitrust law professor has
questioned whether the FTC was too permissive in approving the first two mergers so easily. Novak
& Tanouye, supra note 75, at *2.
77. Burton & Tanouye, supra note 10, at *1 (suggesting that the real motive behind these
mergers is that the drug manufacturers want to "put as many of their drugs on the formulary as
possible" (quoting Alan L. Hillman, Director of the Center for Health Policy at the University of
Pennsylvania)). Ronald L. Ziegler, president and CEO of the National Association of Chain Drug
Stores, stated that "[t]he acquisition of PBMs by drug makers is like letting the fox in the hen
house," and that such acquisitions are really producing less competition. Retail Drug, supra note
13, at *1. Many people recognize that the main reason manufacturers are willing to pay such large
amounts of money to purchase PBMs is to guarantee formulary placement and thereby gain a higher
market share. Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 47.
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effectiveness." For example, some critics feel that PBMs owned by drug
manufacturers might promote the owning manufacturer's generic drugs, thereby
eliminating from the formulary any lower-priced generics produced by other
manufacturers.79 Such activity would have obvious negative effects for the
drug manufacturer's competitors, because once a specific drug receives a
position on the formulary, any drug which is therapeutically similar is then
excluded from the formulary, thus providing the formulary drug with a
"quasi-monopoly."8o
A further concern is that the parent companies will possibly have access to
pricing data and other information concerning their competitors' drugs. 81 A
PBM's database contains a wealth of information on subjects such as drug
utilization, medical costs for certain illnesses, and bid information. 2 The PBM
uses this database when selecting which specific drugs it will place on its
formulary.' The PBM's database may break such information down by
manufacturer, providing drug manufacturers that own PBMs access to
confidential information concerning competitors.' In fact, a Medco executive
78. Superville, supra note 12, at *1 (noting that the concern with Eli Lilly's acquisition of PCS
was that it would result in PCS favoring its parent company's pharmaceutical products); Barnum,
supra note 7, at BI (stating that critics of the mergers "predict that once owned by a drug company,
PBMs will redesign their formularies so that they favor drugs made by its parent, forcing out
competing drugs that might be less expensive"); Dunne & Ryan, supra note 9, at 180 (stating that
critics feel that mergers between drug manufacturers and PBMs "jeopardize[] the objectivity of the
PBMs in selecting drugs for formularies"); Thomas M. Burton, U.S. FTC Approves Lilly's PCS
Purchase But Pledges Scrutiny, WALL ST. J. EUR., Aug. 2, 1995, at 2 (noting that the "overall
concern is whether the Lilly-PCS arrangement-and others like it-could lead to higher drug prices
and to Lilly's profiting at the expense of consumers"). One consultant has stated that despite the
PBMs' claims that their practices will not change due to drug manufacturer ownership, "he has
noticed 'holes' in their formularies where the drug company's competitor's drug isn't included."
Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75, at A3.
79. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *2. See also Kuhlik, supra note 5, at 47 (recognizing that
ownership of a PBM includes the opportunity for the drug manufacturer to affect the PBM's
formulary decisions).
80. Chain Drug, supra note 73, at *2 (noting that a PBM could unfairly enhance the market
share of its parent company's products by placing those products on a separate formulary, and
subsequently price that formulary higher than other formularies that contain more of the competitor's
drugs).
81. Id. (echoing the fear that "parent companies would have access to such data which would
give them a potentially unfair advantage"); Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *2 (stating that there is
a concern that PBMs owned by drug makers will share pricing information with their parent
company).
82. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 4.
83. Id. (noting that a PBM's database contains drug utilization information gleaned from actual
patients). This utilization information can then be used as statistical evidence of a drug's
effectiveness and safety. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
84. See Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *2 (noting the fear that PBM subsidiaries might provide
their parent companies with pricing information concerning the drug manufacturer's competitors).
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stated that Medco is able to provide Merck, its parent company, with data that
aids Merck in tabulating its own offers for other PBMs.15  Furthermore,
although the FTC, in the third industry merger, required Lilly to erect a
"fire-wall" between its divisions to prevent Lilly from obtaining competitors'
pricing and bid information through its PBM subsidiary, the FTC's order would
not prevent Lilly from obtaining other nonconfidential marketing data which
could still give Lilly an unfair advantage over competitors.86 For example, in
their quest to have their drugs placed on a formulary, drug manufacturers may
provide PBMs with marketing or research data regarding their drugs. Since this
specific data is not covered by the FTC's consent order, Lilly, or other parent
companies, could gain access to this data and use it to its competitors'
detriment.
In summary, the trend of drug manufacturers purchasing PBMs has
generated a growing amount of concern.. Specifically, critics of the acquisitions
fear that drug manufacturers now possess an excessive amount of influence over
the creation of drug formularies. This influence, it is feared, will ultimately
result in reduced competition. However, despite these fears, the FTC approved
all of the drug manufacturer/PBM mergers.
C. The FTC's Response to Drug Manufacturer/PBM Mergers
Despite the concern of consumer groups, the FTC's initial response to drug
manufacturers merging with PBMs was minimal at most. In fact, the FTC quite
easily approved the first two mergers, which aligned Merck with Medco and
SmithKline Beecham with Diversified.' However, the FTC's response to the
Lilly/PCS merger differed substantially. Initially, the FTC placed conditions
85. Id. A pharmaceutical industry official noted that this places other drug manufacturers at
a disadvantage. Id. Furthermore, a Merck official admitted that one of the reasons for its
acquisition of Medco was to increase the percentage of Merck drugs on Medco's formularies. Id.
86. Chain Drug, supra note 73, at *2. One critic feels this "fire-wall" will not prevent
collusive activities by manufacturers. Id. The "consent-order" for the Lilly-PCS merger was
intended to prohibit Lilly's access to non-public pricing and bid information PCS receives from other
drug manufacturers. Id. The reasoning is that this information could potentially provide the parent
company with an unfair advantage in placing its own bids. Id. However, the order does not affect
Lilly's access to other information that PCS is not required to keep confidential, and this information
could still provide Lilly with an unfair advantage. Id.
87. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *1; Burton & Tanouye, supra note 10, at *2 (pointing out
that the FTC approved the Merck and SmithKline mergers without limitations). Although it may
seem strange for the FrC to criticize an alliance it previously approved, all three of the mergers
were not examined by the same panel. Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75, at *2. One panel
examined the Merck and SmithKline Beecham mergers, and a different panel examined the
LillyIPCS merger. Id. Thus, the panel which questioned the legality of the Lilly/PCS merger also
decided to reopen investigations into the first two mergers. Id.
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upon Lilly's merger with PCS.' As long as Lilly met the conditions, it would
retain the FTC's approval. But public concern from consumer groups and drug
store officials following this conditional approval prompted the FTC to reopen
investigations into all three of the mergers.8 9 Much of the concern was due to
the fact that the FTC imposed no similar restrictions upon Merck and
SmithKline Beecham when it approved their respective mergers.' In addition,
some consumer groups felt that the conditional requirements would not
adequately protect consumers from "monopolistic practices."' While the FTC
did reopen an investigation into the three mergers, it eventually approved all of
them. 9
88. The FTC imposed the following conditions: (1) Lilly had to separate its pharmaceutical
operations from its management function to ensure confidentiality of competitors' information; (2)
PCS had to "accept all discounts, rebates or other concessions offered by Lilly's competitors for
drugs listed on the formulary"; (3) Lilly had to get FTC approval, for a five-year period, before
buying an interest in any company providing formulary management to more than two million
American patients. Superville, supra note 12, at "1-2. See also Oligopoly the Future for the
Pharma Industry, MARKETI.ErER, Jan. 2, 1995, at *1, available in 1995 WL 2151216 (stating that
Lilly and PCS were required to maintain an open formulary, and Lilly was to "establish a 'fire wall'
to protect sensitive information on its competitors"); Milt Freudenheim, FTC Approves Lilly
Purchase of Drug Distribution Company, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Nov. 4, 1994, at 4D (same).
89. ies Between Drug Makers, Benefit Managers Probed, Dow Jones News Serv., Nov. 25,
1994, available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS (stating that the FTC wrote several letters to drug
manufacturers and PBMs indicating its intent to undertake a broader investigation); Vertical
Arrangements, supra note 74, at *1; Marks, supra note 49, at 2 (noting that the FTC was
reexamining the Merck and SmithIline mergers). See generally Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75,
at A3. SmithKline Beecham's response to the reopening of the investigation was to point out that
when its acquisition of Diversified was approved, Smithline "proposed a voluntary firewall." Id.
In a company statement, SmithKline said, "We strongly believe that the procedures we have in place
are responsive to any reasonable concerns that the FTC or other government representatives may
have, and that these procedures provide an appropriate basis for our ongoing business." Id.
90. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *1 (quoting Ronald L. Ziegler, President and CEO of the
National Association of Chain Drug Stores as stating, "[w]ithout the FTC imposing conditions
similar to the Lilly/PCS case on Merck and SmithKline, the potential for market manipulation and
domination remains a strong likelihood"). Similarly, one member of the FTC who voted against
the Li~ly/PCS merger, despite the conditions, stated that she felt "imposing this order without
addressing similar acquisitions raises a question of evenhandedness and leaves unanswered the
broader question of the competitive effect of vertical integration in this industry." Chain Drug,
supra note 73, at *3 (quoting Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga).
91. Chain Drug, supra note 73, at *1 ("Monopolistic clustering by drug makers will not lead
to lower prices." (quoting Ronald L. Ziegler, president and CEO of the National Association of
Chain Drug Stores)). Mr. Ziegler further stated that he felt the mergers "[would] have an adverse
impact on the marketplace for prescription drugs." Id. Mark Whitener, acting deputy director of
the FTC, also stated that these acquisitions could make it more difficult for competing manufacturers
to enter the market. Tergesen, supra note 56, at Cl.
92. In reality, approval for the Merck/Medco merger and the SmithKline/Diversified merger
was never rescinded. Instead, the companies were a part of the FTC's overall investigation into the
industry. This investigation ultimately led the FTC to grant final approval to the Lilly/PCS merger.
Michael F. Conlan, Fire Wall or Fig Lear, DRUG Topics, Sept. 4, 1995, at 58.
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The FTC gave its final approval for the Lilly/PCS merger in July of
1995." When the FTC announced its approval, it indicated that it would
continue to monitor the PBM and drug manufacturing industry for future viola-
tions in three specific areas." These areas included the following: (1) whether
the mergers would result in other drug manufacturers' products being foreclosed
from the PBM's formulary; (2) whether the mergers foster anticompetitive
dealing among the merged companies; and (3) whether the mergers result in
price increases or a reduction in choices of drugs for consumers. 95
Unfortunately, the FTC gave no indication as to how this monitoring would take
place." Furthermore, the FTC's past actions indicate that it is highly unlikely
that any violations will be found since the FTC already approved the initial
mergers.' Thus, the merged companies have only the existing antitrust
statutes to guide their actions. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has construed
each of these statutes so that they will not effectively deter drug manufacturers
merged with PBMs from using anti-competitive practices.
III. CURRENT ANTITRUST STATUTES: INEFFECTIVE DErERRENTS
Currently, the United States has several antitrust statutes which could
conceivably be applied to the newly merged drug companies in an attempt to
deter anticompetitive conduct.' However, none of these laws, as they are
currently construed, is an effective weapon against such conduct. For each of
the statutes, the Supreme Court has created specific criteria which must be met
before any violation will be found. Because these elements are usually difficult
to prove, the statutes are, in effect, useless against some types of companies,
including drug manufacturers merged with PBMs.
93. Final Approval, supra note 76, at *1.
94. Id. See also Burton, supra note 78, at 2 (quoting FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky as stating
that the FTC may reexamine the mergers in a couple of years and "possibly go back and challenge
the merger[s]"). By stating that it would continue to monitor the industry and the mergers
themselves, the FTC as much as conceded that it feared the merged companies would gain an unfair
advantage and ultimately harm consumers. Superville, supra note 12, at *1.
95. Final Approval, supra note 76, at *2.
96. One member of the FTC voted against approving the merger. Conlan, supra note 92, at
58. Commissioner Mary L. Azcuenaga stated that she felt the consent order was "inadequate" and
was really "no more than a fig leaf to conceal apparent indecision over the extent and nature of the
competitive problem." Id.
97. For the proposition that the FTC will not have the leverage it had when the mergers had
not yet been approved, see Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75, at A3; Conlan, supra note 92, at 58
(noting former Senator Howard Metzenbaum's dubiousness as to "whether the threat of
postacquisition divestiture was credible"); infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
98. These statutes include the Clayton Act, the FTC Act, and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. See supra note 24. See also infra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
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A. Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was designed to govern vertical mergers which
could result in anticompetitive conduct." A vertical merger is one in which
different levels of the same industry merge to form one company."'° A drug
manufacturer merging with a PBM constitutes a vertical merger because the
PBM essentially acts as a distributor for the manufacturer's drugs.'0 ' Because
the FTC has already given its approval to the drug manufacturer/PBM mergers,
however, the Clayton Act has become a weakened weapon. Generally, it is the
FTC's responsibility to proclaim Clayton Act violations." However, the
FTC will most likely not rescind its prior approval of the drug
manufacturer/PBM ,mergers. m Additionally, the Clayton Act cannot be
strengthened by a private cause of action because private plaintiffs other than the
FTC have no cause of action to allege a Clayton Act violation.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., the Supreme Court held that,
generally, a private plaintiff, such as a firm's competitor, has no standing to
challenge a vertical merger. " The private plaintiff has no standing because
"the antitrust laws . . . were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors.'""' Therefore, in Cargill, the Court did not allow the plaintiff
99. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The Act provides that
[n]o person engaged in commerce ... shall acquire ... the whole or any part of the
stock or other share capital... of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
Id.
100. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 16. The most common example of a vertical merger is that
of a manufacturer merging with a company which distributes the manufacturer's products. As a
general rule, interest in vertically integrated companies usually stems from a concern that the
integration's purpose is to gain anticompetitive effects. OuVER E. WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST
ECONOMICS 44 (1987).
101. See supra note 27.
102. Under the F'C Act, the FTC is charged with the responsibility of declaring all unfair
competition unlawful. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Further, in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104 (1986), the Supreme Court held that only the FTC could bring an action for a Clayton
Act violation. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text.
103. Conlan, supra note 92, at 58 (quoting former Senator Howard Metzenbaum who noted that
"he was unaware of any instances where the FTC had sought to undo a previously approved
merger").
104. 479 U.S. 104, 122 (1986). In Cargill, the plaintiff claimed that a merger between a
competitor meat packing company and another packer violated § 7 of the Clayton Act because the
merger would lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Id. at 107. The plaintiff's claim
was based on the fact that the merged companies would now have a market share almost as large
as that of the largest packer in the industry. Id. at 106. For a comprehensive overview of Cargill,
see Michael Malina, Supreme Court Review: 1987, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 289 (1987).
105. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320
(1962)).
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to enjoin a prospective merger under the Clayton Act because the Act would not
provide any relief to the plaintiff even if an injury actually occurred after the
merger took place."° The result of the Cargill holding is that a private
plaintiff cannot challenge a vertical merger, including one between a drug
manufacturer and a PBM, unless the plaintiff can allege a loss "of the type the
antitrust laws were designed to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful."" °  Because of Cargill's holding, the likelihood of
any private plaintiffs having the ability to challenge mergers between drug
manufacturers and PBMs is low."~ The obvious injury that most "plaintiffs"
in such a situation would allege is that the mergers have resulted in reduced
competition."° Unfortunately, as the Court points out in Cargill, absent proof
that reduced competition is actually the result of unfair trade practices, the
merged company's competitors will not be able to challenge the merger under
the Clayton Act."'
Because the Clayton Act affects a relatively small amount of activity, that
of vertical mergers, its use in deterring anticompetitive conduct is quite limited.
Conversely, the FTC Act applies to a wider variety of activity. Unfortunately,
courts have also construed the FTC Act in a manner that has weakened the Act's
ability to deter anticompetitive practices by drug manufacturers merged with
PBMs.
106. Id. at 112 (stating that "[i]t would be anomalous.., to read the Clayton Act to authorize
a private plaintiff to secure an injunction against a threatened injury for which he would not be
entitled to compensation if the injury actually occurred").
107. Id. at 113 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977)).
In Cargill, the plaintiff's claim failed because it merely alleged that the merger would cause the
plaintiff to lose profits. The Court reasoned that this loss in profits was simply due to continued
competition, and the antitrust laws would only be concerned with lost profits resulting from
"practices forbidden by the antitrust laws." Id. at 116.
108. The practical ramification of the Supreme Court's holding in Cargill is that a private
plaintiff, such as a consumer or competitor, cannot file a claim alleging that a prospective merger
violates § 7 of the Clayton Act. Id. at 112.
109. The majority in Cargill pointed out that the mere fact that a competitor loses profits
because it is forced to lower its prices to survive in the market is not enough to prove an antitrust
violation. Malina, supra note 104, at 294. As long as these lower profits are not the result of
illegal practices, no antitrust violation has occurred. Id. Further, if a competitor chooses to
challenge a merger based upon a fear of a future threat, the competitor must prove the merged
companies will actually act with predatory intent or purpose. Id.
110. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986).
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B. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act)"' created the FTC to
oversee mergers, acquisitions, and agreements between companies that might
result in restraining competition." 2 The FTC Act also contains a substantive
provision similar to those found in the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 1
3
Essentially, the FTC Act declares "unfair methods of competition" as
unlawful," 4 and gives the FTC the power to prevent such acts. " 5 Although
this language seems to be broader than that of either the Clayton Act" 6 or the
Sherman Act," s7 it has not resulted in the FTC Act being a sharper deterrent
against anticompetitive conduct.
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the FTC Act broadly, causing many
mergers to fall under the Act's provisions."' For example, in FTC v. Brown
Shoe Co. , 1 the Court determined that the FTC had the power to find trade
practices violative of the FTC Act if the trade practices "conflict with the basic
policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though such practices may not
actually violate these laws."" 2 This holding suggested that the FTC Act was
actually broader than either the Sherman or the Clayton Act, or that the FTC
111. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
112. The FTC Act authorizes the FTC to prohibit persons or companies from using unfair
methods of competition. Id. Therefore, any merger, acquisition, or contract which the FTC deems
to be an unfair method of competition can be prevented. The FTC is presumed to have more
expertise than is available to the courts. HERBERT H. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:
THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRAcTICE 57 (1994).
113. Just as the Clayton Act prohibits vertical mergers that are intended to reduce competition,
the Sherman Act also prohibits practices which attempt to monopolize or conspire in restraint of
trade. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 18 (1994). The FTC Act is similar, except that its language does not
specifically define those activities which are prohibited. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). Instead, the FTC
Act simply prohibits "unfair methods of competition." Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The Act provides that "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared
unlawful." Id.
115. Id. (stating that "[tlhe Commission is empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce").
116. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 140-59 and accompanying text.
118. HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 391. Historically, the FTC Act was interpreted more
broadly than the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Id. However, this interpretation has given way
to a new application of a standard that is similar to the standards used with the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. Id.
119. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
120. Id. at 321.
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Act was intended as a supplement to the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act. 2 '
Similarly, in 1972, the Supreme Court held that the language in the FTC
Act was not limited to proscribing only those practices which violated the "letter
and spirit" of the antitrust laws."2 Instead, the FTC Act granted the FTC the
power to define the language within the FTC Act itself, specifically, what was
meant by an "unfair trade practice."" The Court reasoned that the Act's
broad language indicated congressional intent to protect "consumers as well as
competitors. " 124
However, despite the Supreme Court's statement that the FTC Act is
broader than the other antitrust statutes, lower courts seem reluctant to recognize
that this Act gives the FTC the power to proclaim antitrust violations by
companies. For example, in E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, the
Second Circuit held that to prove a violation of the FTC Act, the FTC must
show both evidence of anticompetitive intent or purpose, and an absence of an
independent business reason for the company's conduct." In Du Pont, the
FTC claimed that several practices by Du Pont and by Ethyl Corporation
resulted in reduced competition. 27 Noting that it was the court's function to
interpret the FTC Act, the Second Circuit determined that Congress did not
intend for the FTC to declare any practice having an adverse effect on
121. Id. at 322 (stating that the FTC Act was designed "to stop in their incipiency acts and
practices which, when full blown, would violate [the Sherman and Clayton] Acts .. . as well as to
condemn as 'unfair methods of competition' existing violations of them" (quoting FTC v. Motion
Picture Adv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953))).
122. FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
123. Id. at 240, 246 (noting that in passing the FTC Act, Congress determined that it would
allow the FTC to decide which actions would be deemed unfair). The Court also listed the factors
that the FTC used to determine whether a practice which does not violate antitrust laws is.
nonetheless unfair. These factors include the following: (1) "[w]hether the practice . . . offends
public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise. . ."; (2)
"whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous"; and (3) "whether it causes
substantial injury to consumers.' Id. at 244 n.5. Ultimately, the Court held that while the FTC had
the power to define unfair trade practices, it had not done so in this case because the Court felt that
the FrC's determination that the company's trade practices were unfair were based upon classic
antitrust doctrines, and the lower court found that the company's activities did not violate the spirit
or the letter of antitrust laws. Id. at 249-50.
124. Id. at 244.
125. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984).
126. Id. at 139. The court felt that the FTC "owes a duty to define the conditions under which
conduct claimed to facilitate price uniformity would be unfair" so the firms would be able to tailor
their actions to conform to the Act. Id.
127. Id. at 130. The practices under scrutiny essentially involved the companies selling their
products at delivered prices, giving certain customers advance notice of price increases, and using
a "most favored nation" clause promising that no customer would be charged a higher price than
another customer. Id.
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competition as violative of the FTC Act." Instead, the court limited the
FTC's authority by stating that the FTC only has the power to "attack[]
collusive, predatory, restrictive or deceitful conduct that substantially lessens
competition. I29
Similarly, in Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,3" the Second Circuit
reversed the FTC's cease and desist order directed toward a company which
published an airline guide to aid in finding connecting flights.' The FTC's
findings indicated that the company's practice of listing only certified air
carriers, while arbitrarily excluding commuter airlines, constituted a violation
of the FTC Act. 32  Despite agreeing with the FTC's findings showing
competitive disadvantages toward the commuter airline companies, the court
held that the FTC Act does not confer such a broad amount of power upon the
Commission. 33 The court indicated that allowing the FTC's order to stand
would vest the FTC with too much discretionary power, resulting in the
Commission "substitut[ing] its own business judgment" in place of the
company's. I"
The Ninth Circuit has also limited the use of the FTC Act towards antitrust
violations. In Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC,35 the court declined to enforce
the FTC's order which found that several plywood-producing companies' pricing
systems violated the FTC Act."3 The court held that unless the FTC could
show that the pricing scheme actually had a stabilizing effect on prices, known
128. Id. at 136.
129. Id. at 137. Since the defendants' conduct did not fall into these categories, the FTC had
no power to order its cessation. Id. Any other application would allow the FTC to act in an
arbitrary manner. Id. at 138.
130. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980).
131. Id. at 921-22, 928.
132. Id. at 923. The Commission argued that its conclusions as to what constitutes an "unfair
method of competition" or an "unfair act or practice" were to be given great weight. Id. at 927
(citing FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965)).
133. Id.
134. Id. The court reasoned that the FTC should not be allowed to evaluate "social, political,
or personal reasons" for a company's decision not to deal with a particular organization. Id.
135. 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980).
136. Id. at 573. The companies involved had a practice of including "western" freight in their
pricing scheme. The reason for the pricing scheme was that originally, all plywood was produced
in the western United States. When southern companies began production, they also included
western freight so their prices could be easily compared to those of western producers. However,
the FTC felt that the justification for such a pricing scheme no longer existed and ordered the
southern companies to discontinue its use. Id. at 574.
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as "price-fixing," it could not proclaim a section 5 violation.'37 The court did
recognize that the FTC constitutes an expert body designed to control any
practice which has the potential to grow into a Sherman section 1 violation if left
unrestrained.'" However, the court noted that while it must give deference
to the FTC at times, it must also accept the responsibility of interpreting the
FTC Act.' 39
Thus, rather than recognize the apparent broad language of the FTC Act,
courts have restricted the FTC Act's use considerably. Because the Clayton Act
and the FTC Act cannot be used to guide drug manufacturer/PBM mergers, the
Sherman Act is the only remaining federal statute that may act as a deterrent to
unfair practices. However, section 2 of the Sherman Act, which applies when
a company attempts to monopolize an industry, fails to provide the needed
deterrent.
C. Section 2 of the Sherman Act
Section 2 of the Sherman Acte' is another example of courts'
interpretations resulting in the Act's limited applicability. The Act is intended
to prohibit monopolization or attempts to monopolize.' 4 While the mergers
between drug manufacturers and PBMs have resulted in a few large companies
dominating the industry, 42 the companies will remain largely insulated from
any violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act because they will not have the
requisite individual market share or market power to violate the Act.
Currently, a company cannot illegally monopolize unless the company "(a)
has 'monopoly power,' which is substantial market power; and (b) has
'exercised' that power." 43 This rule stems from United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America,'" known as the Alcoa case, decided by the Second Circuit.
137. Id. at 577. The court refused to adopt the FTC's recommendations that artificial
price-quoting throughout an industry be deemed a per se violation of the FTC Act. Id. at 581.
Instead, the FTC would be required to prove either collusion or an effect on competition to establish
a § 5 violation. Id. at 582.
138. Id. at 581.
139. Id.
140. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). For a discussion of the history and public sentiment leading up to
the passage of the Sherman Act, see William L. Letwin, Congress and the Shennan Antitrust Law:
1887-1890, 23 U. CHi. L. REV. 221 (1955-56).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Act states that "[elvery person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty. . ." Id.
142. See supra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
143. HOvENKAMP, supra note 112, at 243.
144. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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In Alcoa, Judge Learned Hand introduced his theory that a company with
monopoly power does not necessarily have to use that power to exclude others
to be guilty of a Sherman Act violation. 45 Later, the Court in United States
v. Grinnell Corp. added the second prong to the rule, requiring that the
monopoly power be willfully acquired or maintained."4  However, the key
point in both cases is that the company must possess monopoly power. 47
"Monopoly power" is not easily defined, but most cases attempt to do so
by determining whether the defendant possesses "substantial market power.""
What exactly constitutes substantial market power is difficult in itself to
ascertain, but there are some definite benchmarks. For example, in Grinnell
Corp., the Supreme Court found that a company with eighty-seven percent of
the market had monopoly power. 49 In contrast, the Second Circuit indicated
in Alcoa that a market share of thirty-three percent would definitely not
constitute a monopoly, and that it was doubtful whether a sixty-four percent
market share would constitute monopoly power.'o Thus, a company's
possession of monopoly power turns on the company's market share, and the
result is only conclusive if that power is either very small or extremely large,
such as ninety percent. '5
In the case of drug manufacturers merging with PBMs, the market power
most likely will not reach the level necessary to find an existing monopoly.
While the three mergers mentioned earlier have resulted in the three companies
controlling over eighty percent of the market,152 that number is a result of
combining the three companies' market shares. None of the three merged
companies, alone, has a market share even close to eighty percent; rather, the
highest market share among the companies is around forty-five percent-a
145. Id. at 427 (stating that "it is no excuse for 'monopolizing' a market that the monopoly has
not been used to extract from the consumer more than a 'fair' profit," and that "[t]he Act has wider
purposes").
146. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
147. For example, in Grinnell, the Court stated that a § 2 Sherman Act violation required the
"possession of monopoly power in the relevant market." Id. at 570-71. This monopoly power
equates to the ability to exclude competitors or control prices. Id. at 571.
148. HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 242. See also Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (stating that
monopoly power "may be inferred from the predominant share of the market").
149. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
150. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945). Ultimately,
the court determined that Alcoa had over 90% of the market share, and the court concluded that this
was enough to constitute a monopoly. Id.
151. Monopoly power is to be inferred when a competitor controls a predominant share of the
market. Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. The Grinnel Court intimated that a two-third's share of the
market constituted a monopoly. Id. (citing American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
797 (1946)).
152. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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number which would definitely not constitute a monopoly.'53 As a result,
section 2 of the Sherman Act cannot be used against any of the merged
companies.
Therefore, neither the Clayton Act, the FTC Act, nor section 2 of the
Sherman Act can be used to effectively deter potential anticompetitive conduct
by drug manufacturers merged with PBMs. While the language of each of the
Acts tends to suggest their applicability, courts have construed the Acts so as to
hinder their effective application. Thus, the remaining possible deterrent to
antitrust activity is section 1 of the Sherman Act.
D. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The final antitrust statute which could conceivably apply to drug
manufacturer/PBM mergers is section 1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
conspiracies in restraint of trade."" At first glance, this would be the most
logical statute to apply to drug manufacturers merging with PBMs because the
general fear is that the drug manufacturer and the PBM will conspire to exclude
other manufacturers from formularies, or to obtain confidential information
about competitors. 15 Unfortunately, however, the Supreme Court has
construed this Act so that it will not apply to the merged companies. 5 6  In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., '157 the Court held that a
company and its wholly-owned subsidiary cannot conspire because a conspiracy
requires two entities in law, and two companies which merge together constitute
only a single entity. 1Im  This decision represents a departure from the
previously recognized "intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine" which stated just the
opposite: that it was possible for a company to conspire with its wholly-owned
subsidiary. 19 Because of the Court's decision in Copperweld, the one statute
which would provide the most effective antitrust deterrence to drug
manufacturers merging with PBMs has been rendered useless.
153. Barnum, supra note 7, at B1. In 1993, McKesson's financial reports indicated that PCS
controlled 42% of the PBM market, while Medco and Diversified each controlled 10%. Id. (with
market share being reported as a percent of members).
154. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Act provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form
of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." Id.
155. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
156. See infra notes 169-71, 196-223 and accompanying text.
157. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
158. Id. at 777. See generally section IV.B.
159. Ellen M. Gregg, Note, Antitrust-Repudiation of the Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine:
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 7 CAMPBELL L. REv. 369, 370 (1985) ("The
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine ...provides that section 1 liability is not foreclosed merely
because the parties acting in concert are parent and subsidiary corporations subject to common
ownership"). See generally section W.A.
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In summary, drug manufacturers merged with PBMs possess great potential
to use anticompetitive practices. Further, because of the way courts have
construed the federal antitrust statutes, no effective deterrent exists for the
merged companies. The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, which states that
a parent company and its wholly-owned subsidiary can conceivably conspire
under the Sherman Act, would serve as the best possible deterrent to the merged
companies.
IV. THE INTRAENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE
Prior to Copperweld, the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine served as a
deterrent for potential anticompetitive conduct by a company and its
subsidiary."° The doctrine had achieved acceptance in several Supreme Court
cases decided before Copperweld."6 In essence, the doctrine provided that a
company which conspired with its wholly-owned subsidiary could be charged
with violating section I of the Sherman Act.' 6 2  However, since the
Copperweld decision was handed down, companies no longer fear the threat of
antitrust prosecution, despite many critics' beliefs that some type of deterrent
must be found to prevent anticompetitive activities."'
A. Supreme Court Cases Embracing the Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine
The intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, which the Copperweld Court
effectively abandoned, was previously recognized as a viable weapon against
anticompetitive conduct. For example, in five cases decided prior to
Copperweld, the Supreme Court supported the doctrine." The first, United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., was decided in 1947. In Yellow Cab, the
160. By adopting the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in several previous cases, the Supreme
Court implied that mergers and acquisitions could still occur, but that the merged companies would
still be liable for potential antitrust violations. Such a stance served as a deterrent for
anticompetitive activity. See infra notes 161-85 and accompanying text.
161. See infra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
162. Ann I. Jones, Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: A Decisionmalng
Approach, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1732, 1732-33 (1983). The doctrine essentially provides that two
divisions within one enterprise should be considered multiple actors with the ability to conspire
under the Sherman Act. Id. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
163. See, e.g., Gregg, supra note 159, at 371 (stating that the Copperweld decision ignored
the potential harmful effects of anticompetitive practices); Jones, supra note 162, at 1754 (suggesting
that because subsidiaries often possess authority to make their own decisions, they should be subject
to conspiracy violations).
164. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968);
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Timken Roller
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States,
334 U:S. 110 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
165. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
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Supreme Court concluded that the mere fact that several corporate companies
were under common ownership did not preclude a finding of a section 1
violation of the Sherman Act." The defendants in Yellow Cab were each in
the business of providing taxicabs for use in Chicago, Pittsburgh, New York
City, and Minneapolis. l" The complaint alleged that the companies violated
the Sherman Act by agreeing to purchase all taxicabs from one company, which
resulted in excluding other cab manufacturers, as well as preventing other cab
companies from purchasing from other manufacturers.16 Noting that "the
common ownership and control of the various corporate appellees are impotent
to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the impact of the
[Sherman] Act,"" 9 the Court reversed the district court's order granting a
motion to dismiss.)7 The Court unmistakably declared that the existence of
a vertically integrated organization did not bar the application of section 1 of the
Sherman Act.' 7' Instead of focusing on the form of an integrated
organization, the Court focused on whether any agreement between the two
integrated companies resulted in an "unreasonable restraint on interstate
commerce."172 Thus, Yellow Cab openly stood for the proposition that a
parent company and its subsidiary could conspire.
Similarly, just one year after Yellow Cab, the Court decided Schine Chain
Theatres, Inc. v. United States."in In this case, the Court embraced the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine by finding that a theater parent company and
five of its wholly-owned subsidiaries could form a conspiracy in violation of the
166. The Court noted that a restraint of trade was just as possible in a fully integrated firm as
it was between two independent firms. Therefore, "[tihe corporate interrelationships of the
conspirators. . .[were] not determinative of the applicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is
aimed at substance rather than form." Id. at 227.
167. Id. at 220.
168. Id. at 224.
169. Id. at 227.
170. Yellow Cab reached the Supreme Court on direct appeal from the district court for the
Northern District of Illinois. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Ill.
1946).
171. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947).
172. Id.
173. 334 U.S. 110 (1948). The defendant, Schine Chain Theatres, operated the largest theater
circuit in the United States. Id. at 114. The United States alleged that Schine used this circuit
buying power to negotiate films from distributors and, thereby, restrict competitors. Id. The
complaint charged that the Schine theaters conspired among themselves and with distributors. Id.
at 115. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the distributors granted favors to Schine, such as
giving Schine the first run of movies, refusing to give Schine's competitors second runs, and
allowing Schine lower rental prices than its competitors. Id. at 114. Further, Schine was alleged
to have forced some of its competitors out of business. Id.
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Sherman Act. 174  The Court cited Yellow Cab for the proposition that
co-conspirators did not have to be independent from each other to violate the
Sherman Act. 'I
Again in 195 1, the Court applied the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in
two cases. First, in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. ,76
the Court found that Seagram and its affiliated company violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act by selling their products only to purchasers who would agree to
price ceilings. 7  The Court rejected the notion that because the"conspirators" were "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-
merchandising unit," they could not legally conspire."'~ Second, in Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,"7 the Court found that a parent company
and its subsidiaries in Britain and France had conspired in violation of the
Sherman Act."8  The Court noted that "common ownership or control" does
not immunize contracting companies from antitrust violations.'
The final case prior to Copperweld in which the Supreme Court entertained
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp. " In this case, dealers operating Midas Muffler
Shops claimed that their parent company, Midas, Inc., conspired with its own
174. Id. at 116. The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's findings that the Schine
defendants conspired among themselves to restrain competition. Id. at 115-16. Schine and its
subsidiaries used their power to obtain preferences from distributors and to threaten competitors.
Id.
175. Id. at 116 (stating that "[t]he concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and
the named officers and directors in that endeavor was a conspiracy which was not immunized by
reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated rather than independent").
176. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). Kiefer-Stewart Company brought this action alleging that Seagram
and Calvert Corporation engaged in a conspiracy to sell liquor only to wholesalers who agreed to
resell at fixed prices set by Seagram. Id. at 212. Kiefer-Stewart alleged that this conspiracy
deprived it of a supply of liquor. Id.
177. Id. at 213-14. The Court held that conspiracies formed for the purpose of fixing prices
are illegal per se. Id. at 213.
178. Id. at 215 (finding that Seagram's claim that they were simply "mere instrumentalities
• . . [ran] counter to . . . past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate
corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws").
179. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
180. Id. at 598. The complaint alleged that Timken, an American corporation, conspired with
its British and French subsidiaries to eliminate competition in the manufacture of bearings. Id. at
595. The three companies had business agreements to divide up market territories, fix prices, and
eliminate competition. Id. at 595-96. The Court adhered to the district court's finding that the
dominant purpose of these agreements was to eliminate competition. Id. at 597-98.
181. Id. at 598. The Court rejected Timken's argument that the agreements merely indicated
a "joint venture" between the companies, noting that any agreement to restrain trade could then be
labeled as such. Id.
182. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
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parent corporation, International Parts Corporation, to restrain competition."8 3
Although the Seventh Circuit held that the defendants could not have conspired
because they shared common ownership, the Supreme Court reversed. '
Once again, the Court noted that the parties' common ownership did not serve
to insulate them from antitrust liability. " Thus, the Supreme Court
announced its approval for the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine in five
separate cases. However, the Court rescinded this approval when it decided
Copperweld.
B. The Copperweld Majority Opinion: A Departure from Precedent
Despite the fact that for over thirty-seven years the Supreme Court had
applied the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine,"' in Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., '7 the Court completely repudiated the doctrine."
In Copperweld, a former Copperweld employee created and formed
Independence Tube Corporation, a company which intended to compete in the
steel tubing business."8  A Copperweld subsidiary, Regal Tube Company,
competed in this same market."9  Copperweld and Regal sent letters to any
parties with which Independence Tube Corporation attempted to deal. 191 In
one instance, a company had accepted Independence's order for a tubing mill;
but once the company received one of the letters from Copperweld, it voided its
acceptance, resulting in a nine-month delay in beginning operations for
Independence."is Letters were also sent to banks contemplating financing
Independence's operations, real estate firms considering providing plant space
183. Id. at 135. The plaintiffs, who were Midas dealers, claimed that Midas required them to
sign sales agreements obligating them to purchase all mufflers from Midas. Id. at 136-37. Further,
the agreements required that the dealers refrain from doing business with any of Midas' competitors,
and the agreements also required that the dealers refrain from selling outside of their designated
territories. Id. at 137.
184. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967);
Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 136.
185. Perra Life, 392 U.S. at 141-42 (noting that "the fact of common ownership could not
save them from any of the obligations that the law imposes on separate entities").
186. See supra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
187. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
188. Id. at 777.
189. Id. at 756.
190. Id.
191. Id. These letters were based on a form letter, which stated that "Copperweld would be
'greatly concerned if [Independencel contemplates entering the structural tube market . . . in
competition with Regal Tube.'" Id. at 756-57. The letter also promised that Copperweld would
"take 'any and all steps ... necessary to protect [its] rights.'" Id.
192. Id. at 757.
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to Independence, and prospective suppliers and customers. ir The effect of
these letters was to thwart Independence's attempts at gaining any clientele in
the steel tubing business. " The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh
Circuit's decision which found that Copperweld and its subsidiary had conspired
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.9 5 In doing so, the Court
effectively discarded thirty-seven years of precedent."9  However, the
majority opinion indicated that no such binding precedent existed because four
out of the five earlier intraenterprise conspiracy cases had alternate grounds for
their results."9
The Court, in a conclusory manner, disposed of the four cases previously
used as a basis for applying the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. For
example, the Court stated that United States v. Yellow Cab Co., recognized as
the case which "breathed life into the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine,"'"
was never intended to stand for such a proposition."re Rather, the Court
indicated that what it meant when it stated that "the common ownership and
control of the various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged
combination and conspiracy from the impact of the [Sherman] Act" was that a"pattern of acquisitions" may create a combination or conspiracy in violation of
section 1.10 However, under section 7 of the Clayton Act, acquisitions are
193. Copperweld Corp. v. IndependenceTube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 757 (1984). Copperweld
and its subsidiary later claimed that the letters were only intended to prevent third parties from
developing reliance interests which would later dissuade a judge from enjoining Independence's
operations. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 758-59. The Seventh Circuit recognized that its decision "left a parent company and
its wholly owned subsidiary as the only parties to the § I conspiracy," but still determined "that
liability was appropriate 'when there is enough separation between the two entities to make treating
them as two independent actors sensible'" Id. at 758-59 (quoting Independence Tube Corp. v.
Copperweld Corp., 691 F.2d 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1982)).
196. See supra notes 164-85 and accompanying text.
197. The Court stated that "[a]lthough the Court has expressed approval of the doctrine on a
number of occasions, a finding of intra-enterprise conspiracy was in all but perhaps one instance
unnecessary to the result." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 760. Instead, the Court indicated that it had
never really examined the doctrine in depth, but support for the doctrine emerged from what the
Court considered to be a narrow holding in Yellow Cab. Id.
198. Id. at 761.
199. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). The Court
referred to what it called "the ambiguity of the Yellow Cab holding .... ." Id. at 763. Ironically,
it was the Supreme Court itself that followed the Yellow Cab holding in four cases decided prior to
Copperweld. See supra notes 173-85 and accompanying text.
200. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 760. The Court further noted that this combination would
especially be deemed illegal if an "original anticompetitive purpose is evident from the affiliated
corporations' subsequent conduct." Id. at 761. In the case of the defendants in Yellow Cab, the
Court stated that their affiliation was irrelevant "because the original acquisitions were themselves
illegal." Id. See also United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944)
(holding that the "creation of the combination [was] itself the violation").
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generally reviewed at the time of the merger."' The Court's suggestion that
now the Sherman Act, instead of the Clayton Act, can be used to invalidate a
vertical merger at the time of the merger seems greatly misplaced. The
Sherman Act is not intended to govern new mergers; instead, the Clayton Act
applies to new mergers and acquisitions.' Furthermore, if a proposed
merger receives FTC approval under the Clayton Act, it would seem unlikely
that the Sherman Act could then reverse that approval simply by claiming that
the acquisition was unlawful from the beginning.3 If this were the case, the
acquisition should never have been approved under the Clayton Act in the first
place.
The Court used similar reasoning to distinguish Copperweld from Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States.' The Court noted that Schine relied
on Yellow Cab for its holding, but also pointed out that the finding of an
intraenterprise conspiracy was not necessary to the holding. 5 The doctrine
was deemed extraneous because the Court also found a monopoly violation, and
because the defendants had conspired with independent film distributors. °W
The Court gave this same reasoning as a basis for distinguishing Copperweld
from both Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States 7 and Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.2 The Court reasoned that in
neither of the above two cases "was the [intraenterprise conspiracy] doctrine
necessary to the result reached."' For example, in Timken, the foreign
"subsidiaries" were not wholly-owned by the American corporation, nor were
they controlled by the American corporation.2 0 Therefore, the intraenterprise
201. See generally section IMl.A.
202. The Clayton Act prohibits a company or person from acquiring the stock or capital of
another person or company engaged in commerce when the acquisition would result in substantially
reduced competition. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). The reference to the acquisition of stock includes
mergers in which one corporation purchases another corporation, as drug manufacturers are doing
with PBMs.
203. If a proposed merger is inherently unlawful, the Clayton Act's purpose is to prevent the
merger from ever taking place. Therefore, if the FTC approves a proposed merger under the
Clayton Act, the presumption is that the merger is lawful. Any subsequent action taken by the FTC
via the Sherman Act would then be based upon the merged companies' post-approval conduct, not
upon the original lawfulness of the merger.
204. 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
205. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763 n.8 (1984).
206. Id.
207. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
209. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
209. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 764.
210. Id. at 765. Further, the stock acquisitions of the foreign companies "were themselves
designed to effectuate restrictive practices." Id.
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conspiracy doctrine relating to wholly-owned subsidiaries did not apply.21'
Further, in Perma Life, the plaintiffs were franchisees of the defendant
corporation and its subsidiaries; the plaintiffs were not wholly-owned
subsidiaries." The Copperweld Court noted that the majority in Perma Life
stated that the plaintiffs themselves could charge a conspiracy "between
themselves and the defendants or between the defendants and other franchise
dealers."213 The Court reasoned, therefore, that the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine "was at most only an alternative holding."'214
Unfortunately, for the Copperweld Court, the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons 5 was more than
simply an alternative holding.216 The Court recognized that the Kiefer-Stewart
holding went beyond what the Court interpreted as the "narrow" holding of
Yellow Cab.217 However, the Court stated that "[in straying beyond Yellow
Cab, the Kiefer-Stewart Court failed to confront the anomalies an
intra-enterprise doctrine entails." 218  The Court's main support for
disregarding Kiefer-Stewart's direct approval of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine rested on what the result would have been if the case were decided in
1984. The Court claimed that t'he same result would have occurred in 1984 by
using a theory that Seagram's subsidiary conspired with companies other than
its parent corporation. 219  However, the Court cannot justify abandoning
precedent by simply changing the issue of the original case. Through a close
examination of the facts of Kiefer-Stewart, one can clearly see that it was never
alleged that Seagram's subsidiary conspired with outside companies. The
complaint alleged that the subsidiary conspired with Seagram, its parent
corporation.2m Therefore, while the Court should have distinguished
Copperweld's facts from Kiefer-Stewart, it never did. Ironically, the
Copperweld Court did exactly what it charged the Kiefer-Stewart Court with
doing: "offhandedly [dismissing] the defendants' argument that 'their status as
211. The Copperweld Court was careful to point out that its holding was limited to the issue
of whether a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary were capable of conspiring under
section one of the Sherman Act. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
767 (1984).
212. Id. at 765-66.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
216. The Copperweld Court indicated it felt that Kiefer-Stewarn was "the one case giving
support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 763.
217. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763 (1984).
218. Id. at 764.
219. Id.
220. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211,212 (1951). "The
complaini charged that respondents, [Seagrams and its distributor, Calvert], had agreed or conspired
. " Id. (emphasis added).
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"mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandising unit" makes it
impossible for them to have conspired.'""' The Court merely pointed out that
Kiefer-Stewart's holding relied on a citation to Yellow Cab, which the
Copperweld Court had previously indicated should not have been relied on for
the proposition that a company and its wholly-owned subsidiary could conspire
to violate the Sherman Act.'
However, at the same time the Copperweld Court was denouncing the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, it recognized that its holding would leave a
"'gap' in the [Sherman] Act's proscription against unreasonable restraints of
trade."' Because this "gap" has never been filled, many vertically integrated
companies, such as drug manufacturers and PBMs, are, in essence, immune
from antitrust liability.
C. Criticism of Copperweld: The Dissent and Other Commentators
The dissent in Copperweld pointed out that the Court's decision left a major
gap in antitrust law. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
systematically attacked the majority's reasoning for abandoning precedent.'
The dissent focused on the fact that Copperweld Corporation and its subsidiary,
Regal Tube Company, clearly acted for the purpose of restraining trade. 5
Furthermore, Justice Stevens felt that the Court could not distinguish
Kiefer-Stewart from Copperweld.z' He noted that the defendant in
Kiefer-Stewart had argued essentially the same theory as Copperweld
Corporation had: that Yellow Cab should only be applied to cases involving
unlawful acquisitions. 7  Thus, the Supreme Court, in Kiefer-Stewart, had
already rejected the approach which the Copperweld Court adopted.'
Therefore, contrary to the majority's claims, the majority did abandon precedent
221. Copperwed, 467 U.S. at 763-64 (quoting language from Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 215).
222. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
223. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984). See also
Gregg, supra note 159, at 380 (noting that "short of threatened monopolization, the Sherman Act
does not reach the anticompetitive conduct of a single firm, even though its effects may be
indistinguishable from the effects of a two-firm conspiracy").
224. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 778-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
225. Id. at 778 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the purpose of Copperweld's letters was
to exclude Independence, a potential competitor, from the market).
226. Id. at 778-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
227. Id. at 782 (Stevens, I., dissenting).
228. In Kiefer-Stewan, the defendants had argued that "their status as 'mere instrumentalities
of a single manufacturing-merchandising unit'" denied them the ability to conspire. Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram& Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951). However, the Supreme Court flatly
rejected this proposition, and instead relied on Yellow Cab. Id. The Court further noted that the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine was especially applicable because the defendants held themselves
out as competitors. Id.
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set by Kiefer-Stewart.' 9 Justice Stevens also found compelling the fact that
almost all commentators and lower courts had concluded that the Supreme
Court's cases established that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary were
capable of conspiring in violation of the Sherman Act.' The dissent accused
the majority of "elevat[ing] form over substance," implying that the majority's
rule focused only on the fact that the subsidiary was wholly-owned by the parent
corporation and ignored the possibility that these two entities could still agree
to restrain trade.23
As an alternative to the per se rule adopted by the majority, the dissent
recommended continuing to follow Yellow Cab, which stated that "It]he test of
illegality under the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint
on interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from a
conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise
independent."" Justice Stevens indicated that this approach would fill the gap
left by the majority's decision, while still allowing economically efficient
229. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 782 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
230. Id. at 783-84 (Stevens, I., dissenting). See also William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. rrI'
Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014, 1054 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the defendants'
parent-subsidiary relationship did not preclude the finding of an illegal conspiracy); Ogilvie v.
Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588-89 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that the separate incorporation of a
subsidiary does not automatically provide a defense to § 1 liability); Las Vegas Sun, Inc. v. Summa
Corp., 610 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that if a corporate parent and its subsidiary are
sufficiently independent from each other, they may conspire in restraint of trade); Photovest Corp.
v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 726 (7th Cir. 1979) (same); Columbia Metal Culvert Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 579 F.2d 20, 33 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine provided for a finding of a conspiracy between a corporation and its
wholly-owned subsidiary); H&B Equip. Co. v. International Harvestor Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 1978) (noting that, especially when the two corporations compete with each other, a parent.
corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary can conspire in violation of the Sherman Act); George
R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 557 (1st Cir. 1974) (recognizing
that conspiracies among associated corporations are possible). See also Milton Handier & Thomas
A. Smart, The Present Status of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine, 3 CARDOZO L. REV. 23
(1981); Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: A Suggested
Standard, 75 MICH. L. REv. 717 (1977) [hereinafter Suggested Standard]; Phillip Areeda,
Intraenterprise Conspiracy in Decline, 97 HARv. L. REV. 451 (1983).
231. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 789 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Gregg, supra note 159,
at 378 (stating that the majority failed to "address the significance of the anticompetitive conduct
engaged in by the defendants"). "The majority's holding.., automatically elevates the form of the
corporation over the reality of the substantial restraint of trade." Id.
232. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 779 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947)).
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mergers to exist.23  In essence, the dissent's proposal would follow the
general rule used for all alleged violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act: the
Rule of Reason.' This would mean that in analyzing an alleged conspiracy
or contract in restraint of trade, a court would use a reasonableness standard to
determine whether the agreement was adopted for legitimate efficiency purposes,
in which case -it would be legal.? Conversely, if the agreement was adopted
for the sole purpose of restraining competition, it would violate the Sherman
Act.2 The rule of reason, the dissent felt, would allow for "procompetitive
integration," while, at the same time, it would provide a deterrent for
anticompetitive integration. 2 7  However, the dissent's proposal would
essentially follow Yellow Cab and apply the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
to all merged companies.' This approach could possibly deter companies
from merging for fear that they will be found guilty of an antitrust violation,
which is exactly what the Copperweld majority hoped to avoid. 2 9
Other commentators have also criticized the Copperweld holding for not
adhering to precedent and for not admitting the realities of anticompetitive
233. Id. at 790-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the Yellow Cab holding
was economically justified because it allowed antitrust enforcement to reach anticompetitive
agreements that might possibly restrain competition, but would not attain sufficient power to be
considered monopolies under § 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 790-91. Justice Stevens stated that the
majority's holding in Copperweld left "a significant gap in the enforcement of § 1 with respect to
anticompetitive conduct that is entirely unrelated to the efficiencies associated with integration." Id.
at 789.
234. The "Rule of Reason" began in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), and was later adopted in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
This approach analyzes activities by companies using a reasonableness standard. Addyston stated
that any restraint of trade that is larger than necessary is unreasonable, and, therefore, unlawful.
Addyston, 85 F. at 282. The Supreme Court, in Standard Oil Co., indicated that "in every case
where it is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of [Sherman § 1] the rule of reason, in light
of the principles of law and the public policy which the act embodies, must be applied." Standard,
221 U.S. at 66.
235. Agreements that actually enhance competition would not be violative of the antitrust laws
because they do not result in the dangers the Sherman Act was enacted to prevent. Copperweld
Corp. v. IndependenceTube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 778 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 792-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
But if the behavior at issue is unrelated to any functional integration between the
affiliated corporations and imposes a restraint on third parties of sufficient magnitude
to restrain marketwide competition, as a matter of economic substance, as well as form,
it is appropriate to characterize the conduct as a "combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade."
Id.
237. Id. at 794 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 790-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 771 (noting that Yellow Cab might discourage corporations from decentralizing and
creating divisions, thus depriving consumers of the economic benefits this type of organization might
provide).
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conduct.' It has been argued that allowing a Sherman Act violation by
incorporated subsidiaries would simply place the same threat of antitrust liability
on subsidiaries that is on every other person or organization covered by the
Act." Furthermore, although the majority used economic efficiency as a
basis for its holding, many argue that the Court failed to recognize that potential
antitrust liability deters anticompetitive behavior and, therefore, promotes
economic efficiency. u2  The Copperweld dissent and later critics of the
majority's decision all point out that many merged companies, including drug
manufacturers merged with PBMs, are now free to practice as they choose
without any threat of antitrust liability.3'
Because drug manufacturers merged with PBMs lack any real incentive to
avoid unfair practices, a change is necessary. However, there is no need for the
legislature to pass new legislation concerning the matter. Ample antitrust
legislation already exists within the Clayton Act, the FTC Act, and the Sherman
Act. The problem is the Supreme Court's interpretation of these acts,
particularly section 1 of the Sherman Act.' While Yellow Cab, as well as
the Copperweld dissent, went too far in allowing intraenterprise conspiracies,
and thereby deterred potentially efficient mergers from occurring, 24 the
Copperweld majority strays too far in the opposite direction.' Copperweld
causes the most effective deterrent, Sherman section 1, to cease to exist with
respect to drug manufacturer/PBM mergers. The solution lies in finding a
"middle ground" between Yellow Cab and Copperweld.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: CREATING AN EXCEPTION TO COPPERWELD
The Supreme Court should create a limited exception to its Copperweld
holding. This exception would allow the courts to apply the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine to certain corporations and their wholly-owned subsidiaries.
Application of the exception would continue to allow mergers to occur for
economic efficiency reasons, thereby alleviating the concern of the Copperweki
240. Gregg, supra note 159, at 371 (stating that the Copperweld Court prematurely repudiated
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine); David J. Brown, Comment, Antitrust Law-The Demise of
the Jntraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrine: Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 10 J.
CORP. L. 785, 797 (1985) (claiming that the Sherman Act does allow for a finding that affiliated
corporations can conspire).
241. Gregg, supra note 159, at 379.
242. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 240, at 799.
243. See supra notes 224-42 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 165-72, 224-39 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 186-223 and accompanying text.
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Court. 7 Only those corporations and their subsidiaries that meet specific
criteria would ultimately be subject to the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine.
Once a court determines that a merged entity meets these criteria, the court
would then use the standard Rule of Reason to determine if an antitrust
conspiracy actually exists.' Thus, the exception would simply provide the
criteria to be used to determine whether the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
should apply.
Although the antitrust laws were meant to promote economic efficiency and
competition, 9 Copperweld claims that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
thwarts that goal because it fails to allow companies to realize these efficiencies
through vertical integration.' However, without the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine, a gap exists in antitrust law."' This gap allows
companies to use anticompetitive illegal practices in vertical integration without
being subject to antitrust liability. 2  While applying the intraenterprise
conspiracy doctrine in a blanket fashion to all vertically integrated companies
would provide justification for the Copperweld Court's concerns, a limited
exception would successfully address those fears and fill the gap that currently
exists in the law.
Because of the high probability of a drug manufacturer engaging in
anticompetitive practices with its wholly-owned PBM subsidiary, and because
247. The Coppetweld Court feared that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine might discourage
corporations from creating incorporated divisions, thereby depriving consumers of the economic
efficiencies that can result from a decentralized form of management. Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984). The Court listed examples of reasons why
a corporation may create a subsidiary, including achieving tax benefits or improving management.
Id. at 772-73.
248. See supra notes 232-39 and accompanying text.
249. Jones, supra note 162, at 1738-39 (suggesting that any application of antitrust law must
encourage procompetitive practices such as vertical integration).
250. Handler & Smart, supra note 230, at 44 (claiming that there is not a public policy or an
antitrust law justification for the rule that a corporation and its subsidiary can conspire and that
courts should hold that such a finding is impossible); Everett I. Willis & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
Consequences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 20, 26-27 (1968) (noting that
corporations usually incorporate subsidiaries for reasons other than to affect the market or
competition); Suggested Standard, supra note 230, at 727 (warning against emphasizing the form
of integrated companies, which results in inhibiting many economically efficient agreements, rather
than the substance of the agreement).
251. Coppeiweld, 467 U.S. at 779; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 250, at 22 (noting that
because it is difficult to prove monopolistic practices, the conduct of a single enterprise often falls
beyond the reach of antitrust laws); Brown, supra note 240, at 785 (noting that unilateral conduct
is not subject to § 1 of the Sherman Act, and that § 2 only applies when monopolization can be
proved).
252. Brown, supra note 240, at 799 (noting that the Court, in Copperweld, failed to realize that
potential antitrust liability would serve as a deterrent to anticompetitive practices).
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none of the current antitrust statutes, as construed, are effective in deterring
such conduct, the Court should create an exception to the Copperweld
holding. 3 This exception would apply when a parent company's goals and
its subsidiary company's goals would be served by opposing practices, as is the
situation with drug manufacturers and PBMs. 2  Further, the doctrine would
apply when the goods or services the merged companies produce are subject to
inelastic demand. 2 By creating an exception to the Copperweld holding, the
Supreme Court would recognize that, in limited situations, the form of a
company and its subsidiary is irrelevant to the plausibility of the companies
conspiring to restrain trade. 256  Rather than focus on the form of the
relationship, meaning whether the subsidiary is separately incorporated, the
exception would focus on the actual ability of the companies to conspire.
A. The Proposed Exception to Copperweld
Any exception to Copperweld must provide for procompetitive vertical
integration while, at the same time, deter such arrangements when they are
intended to hinder competition. Such an exception would ensure that the
antitrust goals of promoting competition are advanced. Therefore, the exception
must apply only when companies meet specific criteria that indicate a strong
potential for anticompetitive practices.
1. Why Drug Manufacturers Merged with PBMs Merit Special Treatment
Drug manufacturers aligned with PBMs have two major incentives to
practice anticompetitively. First, the drug manufacturer has the complete
opposite goal of the PBM: the manufacturer wants to sell its drugs at the
highest price possible, while the PBM, by definition, exists to offer lower prices
to its subscribers. Second, drug manufacturers know that even when prices are
raised, many people will continue to purchase pharmaceuticals at the same rate
as before. While a PBM with a formulary containing drugs that are not
cost-effective or clinically effective runs the risk of losing subscribers, 2" a
PBM owned by a drug manufacturer may not have the final decision-making
253. See supra notes 75-86, 98-159 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 260-62 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
256. The Copperweld Court claimed that the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine placed too
much focus on the form of a parent and its subsidiary. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 766-67 (1984). The Court stated that the mere fact that a subsidiary is
separately incorporated does not mean it should be treated as a separate entity for conspiracy
purposes. Id. However, the Court's ruling makes the same mistake. It creates a blanket rule that
a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary can never conspire. This is truly exalting form over
substance.
257. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
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authority as to what drugs will actually be placed on the formulary.'
Industry officials claim that they have already seen gaps which exclude a
competitor manufacturer's drugs in the formularies of PBMs owned by drug
manufacturers.' The implication is that these gaps are the result of
anticompetitive practices.
First, a drug manufacturer conspiring with a PBM is highly plausible
because the two newly merged companies ultimately have diametrically opposed
goals. Both the manufacturer and the PBM want to obtain as high a profit
margin as possible and, at the same time, retain a large amount of
consumers. m  However, each company uses a different method to generate
its profits. A drug manufacturer, just like any other ordinary manufacturer,
attempts to earn revenue by selling its product at the highest price the market
will bear. 2" In other words, a drug manufacturer prices pharmaceuticals at
the highest price it can without suffering a loss of consumers. In contrast, the
PBM does the opposite. PBMs, as managed care entities, seek to manage their
subscribers' pharmaceutical care by offering pharmaceuticals at discounted
prices. 2  This situation gives the parent company manufacturer great
incentive to force its PBM subsidiary to increase the manufacturer's
pharmaceutical prices.
The second factor providing drug manufacturers with the incentive to
conspire with their subsidiary PBMs is that the drug industry has a unique
258. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
259. Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75, at A3. John Fortin, a consultant for a firm that reviews
PBMs, stated that he has noticed "holes" in formularies of PBMs owned by drug manufacturers.
Id. These "holes" suggest that the parent company's competitors' drugs are being excluded from
the formulary. Id.
260. A manufacturer will generally set a price at a point where the price and quantity of a good
are balanced. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLiAM D. NoRDHAUs, ECONOMICS 64 (12th ed. 1985).
This price represents a price at which consumers are willing to purchase and manufacturers are still
willing to sell. Id.
261. The Law of Demand states that the amount of a good that will be purchased varies
inversely with the price of that good. PAUL F. GEMMILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMICS 384 (6th
ed. 1960). This means that if the price is set lower, more of the goodwill be purchased. Id. Of
course, the manufacturer does not want to set low prices. Therefore, the manufacturer increases the
price up to the point where revenue will be maximized (with revenue being the price of a good
multiplied times the quantity purchased). Id. at 380-81. This price is determined by examining both
the demand for a good and the supply of the good. Id. at 398. The optimum price is the point
referred to as "equilibrium of demand and supply." Id. See also C.E. FERGUSON & S. CHARLES
MAURICE, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 44-47 (rev. ed. 1974).
262. See supra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
Timm: The Intraenterprise Conspiracy Doctrin and the Pharmaceutical Ben
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996
346 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31
characteristic: relatively unchanging demand in the face of increased prices. 63
This phenomenon is true of almost all areas of healthcare for one simple reason:
most people will go to great lengths to ensure good health.' Generally, a
person will pay large amounts of money, even to the point of going deeply into
debt, to become healthy.' Therefore, while a PBM's purpose is to offer
effective drugs at a lower price, people who are sick and need medicine
generally will not question the cost of a prescribed pharmaceutical.'
263. BARRY R. FuRRow Er AL., HEALTH LAw 662-63 (2d ed. 1991). The marketplace for
pharmaceuticals has generally exhibited extremefl high profits without any real price competition.
Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *1. Also, many patients are not concerned about the price of
pharmaceuticals because their insurance pays the cost. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 1.
264. Admittedly, those people who simply cannot afford medical care are often forced to do
without it. However, when discussing PBMs, it should be understood that PBMs affect only people
with insurance. A PBM is a method of managing pharmaceutical care. Therefore, if a PBM
engages in unfair competition, the consumers who are injured are the same people the PBM is
supposed to protect: its insureds.
265. See RICHARD K. THOMAS, HEALTH CARE CONSUMERS IN THE 1990S 38 (1993) (noting
that cost is often not a consideration for traditional healthcare consumers). Often healthcare demand
is not elastic; this is commonly a result of patients facing serious health conditions which must be
treated. Id. at 39. Elasticity is the concept that the change in demand for goods or services is a
direct result of the change in price of those goods and services. WILLIAM J. WARD, AN
INTRODUCTION TO HEALTH CARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 6 (1988).
There are several explanations for the relative inelasticity of demand for healthcare services,
including pharmaceutical services. The most common reasoning recognizes that the decision-making
process for healthcare considers much more than simply cost. THOMAS, supra, at 77. For example,
a person's emotions play a large part in the decision, simply because a person's very life may be
at stake. Id. (noting that a person's decision may be "driven by everything from fear to vanity").
The second common explanation for unchanging demand in the healthcare industry is the fact that
consumers (or patients) are often unaware of the prices. Id. at 78. This "ignorance" may be a
result of the patient not caring, because other factors have motivated the decision to seek services.
Alternatively, the lack of knowledge regarding prices may simply be a result of the prevalence of
third-party payer systems such as HMOs, PPOs, and Medicare. Under such a system, a patient is
not ultimately responsible for payment. Id. When a third party insurance company is responsible
for paying the patient's bill, those persons who order and select healthcare services, including
physicians and patients, are completely outside of the monetary environment. WARD, supra, at 9.
Because of this "alienation," any change in price is unlikely to affect the decision-making, and
therefore unlikely to change demand. Id. Another model analyzing the unique status of healthcare
demand lists three components, other than price, affecting the decision to use healthcare services:
predisposing, enabling, and need. MICHAEL D. ROSKO & ROBERT W. BROYLES, THE ECONOMICS
OF HEALTH CARE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 74 (1988). This theory recognizes that a person's
age, sex, marital status, or beliefs about illness may cause a predisposition to use healthcare services.
Id. Further, the person's perception of his or her health status will affect whether an actual need
for services is felt. Id. Lastly, a person's income and insurance coverage, as well as the availability
and accessibility of services, affect whether the person is actually enabled to receive the services.
Id. The influence of these factors on consumers' decisions to purchase healthcare services
diminishes the influence price increases have on such decisions.
266. See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
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2. Model Legal Reasoning: A Guide for the Court in Creating an Exception
to Copperweld
Despite the fact that PBMs exist to offer lower pharmaceutical prices,
anticompetitive practices between PBMs and drug manufacturers still threaten
the industry. One argument asserts that a PBM acquired by a drug manufacturer
cannot afford to use anticompetitive practices because it will lose business to
other PBMs which are not owned by drug manufacturers. 267 Proponents of
this argument claim that although drug manufacturers themselves are also
consolidating, this consolidation is unlikely to inhibit competition as long as
numerous PBMs exist to encourage continued competition.' However, the
three merged companies discussed above currently control over eighty percent
of the PBM market, which indicates a lack of other powerful PBMs to increase
the competition.' Therefore, if all three of these companies engage in
anticompetitive practices, resulting in higher pharmaceutical prices, smaller
PBMs are likely to follow their lead." ° If the consumer prices in eighty
percent of the market increase, none of the large merged companies will likely
suffer a loss of subscribers; that is, each company will be viewed as offering a
competitive price in comparison to each other.27 For this reason, the mergers
267. PBM Strategies, supra note 15, at *1. One critic feels that because PBMs are intended
to encourage price competition, there was no reason for the FTC to impose conditions upon the
Lilly/PCS merger. Id. (stating the opinion of Hemant Shah of HKS & Co.). This critic also feels
that a PBM will lose business if it fails to offer savings to its subscribers; that the actual reason for
the mergers was that the drug manufacturers wanted guaranteed access to subscribers, not
information on its competitors; and that the restricted formularies of PBMs are "unlikely to face
much resistance from physicians or patients." Id. See also Barnum, supra note 7, at Bi (noting
that pharmaceutical "industry officials argue that the competitive pressures are so intense that PBMs
cannot afford to play favorites").
268. Krulwich, supra note 1, at 9.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 73-74.
270. See, e.g., Vertical Arrangements, supra note 74, at 3 (noting the strong potential for
domination and market manipulation by the three PBMs merged with drug manufacturers); Chain
Drug, supra note 73, at * 1 (echoing the concern that the acquisition of PBMs by drug manufacturers
is simply a method of transferring wealth to the merged companies at the expense of consumers).
One drug store official feels that the mergers will have a negative impact on the entire PBM market.
Id. This concern is especially present because, unlike the conditions placed on the Lilly/PCS
merger, no conditions were placed on the Merck/Medco or SmithKline/Diversified mergers. Retail
Drug, supra note 13, at *1. Additionally, the PBM market is already highly concentrated, which
makes it difficult for new competitors to enter the market. Superville, supra note 12, at *2.
271. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *1 (noting that if 80% of consumers are moved into PBM
plans, as is predicted, and the majority of PBMs are run by drug manufacturers, little incentive to
offer competitive prices will exist).
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could easily result in anticompetitive practices which ultimately will cause
consumer prices to rise.m
The first step in applying an exception to Copperweld is to examine the
goals of both the parent company and its subsidiary. However, the mere fact
that the goals are different should not alone trigger application of the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. For example, a manufacturer of any item
will always want to maintain as high a price as possible to achieve the best
profit.' Conversely, the distributor for that manufacturer's items will want
to sell as many items as possible and may, therefore, be willing to sell at a
lower cost. Thus, the two entities' goals appear to oppose one another.
However, unlike the healthcare industry, most other industries will face lowering
demand as prices increase. 4  Consequently, an ordinary manufacturer has
less incentive to force its subsidiary to sell at higher prices. 27 5  Meanwhile,
a drug manufacturer possesses far greater incentive to request that its subsidiary
272. Id. at *2 (stating that vertical integration in the PBM industry will ultimately lead to less
competition and result in higher prices); Chain Drug, supra note 73, at *I (stating that the mergers
will harm the public and result in higher prescription drug prices). Unless the FTC imposes
requirements that the PBMs owned by drug manufacturers maintain price competitive formularies,
they will have no incentive to do so. Id. at *2. The increased wealth from higher priced
formularies will then benefit the vertically integrated drug manufacturer/PBM companies, and harm
consumers. Id. at *1.
Further, the FTC itself admitted that reduced competition is a possible result of these mergers.
Novak & Tanouye, supra note 75, at *2. One industry consultant believes that the FTC's order that
prices remain confidential will actually cause prices to increase. Id. In fact, the National
Association of Chain Drug Stores has officially petitioned the FTC to reopen its prior approval of
Lilly's acquisition of PCS. NACDS Asks FTC to Reopen Lilly Consent, CHAIN STORE AGE
EXECUTIVE FAX, Aug. 5, 1996, available in WESTLAW, 1996 WL 8626246. This organization
claims that drug manufacturer ownership of PBMs has resulted in increased prices and reduced
competition. Id. It further claims that because of the overall increased drug prices, drug
manufacturers are now offering their products at higher prices to other PBMs, not just the PBMs
that they own. The petition requested that the FTC strengthen provisions in the consent order for
the Lilly Merger and that these strengthened provisions be applied to other similar mergers in the
industry. Id.
273. This price will be set according to both the available supply of the product and the demand
for the product. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 260, at 64-66. These factors balance to
what is known as "equilibrium of supply and demand." Id. at 64. Therefore, if the manufacturer
increases the price beyond the equilibrium point, the demand for the product would decrease. Id.
at 64-65. See also WILLIS S. PETERSON, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 141-43 (3d ed. 1977)
(explaining the profit-maximizing rule, under which a producer makes the quantity of products at
which the cost of each unit is equal to the added returns of each unit). See infra notes 274-76 and
accompanying text.
274. The Law of Demand states that as prices increase, the quantity of a good that will be
purchased decreases. GEMMILL, supra note 261, at 384.
275. Based on the Law of Demand, if a manufacturer increases prices for a product, the
quantity purchased will decrease. Id. Subsequently, the manufacturer will receive lower revenues.
Id.
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PBM sacrifice its goals of low pharmaceutical prices and place the parent
company's drugs on the formulary, regardless of their cost or effectiveness. 276
Therefore, the second step in determining whether to apply the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine is to examine whether the goods or services
that the merged companies produce result in elastic or inelastic demand. Elastic
demand exists when the quantity of the good or service is sensitive to price
changes, meaning fewer goods are bought when the price increases, and vice
versa.' If a good or service produces elastic demand, it would not be
economically wise for a manufacturer to insist that its subsidiary sell at an
extremely high price. Doing so would only reduce consumption of the good or
service. Conversely, when demand is inelastic, changes in price only slightly
affect the change in sales.'
Several factors indicate that the demand for healthcare goods and services,
including pharmaceuticals, is inelastic.' 7 First, few, if any, substitutes exist
for pharmaceuticals.' This lack of substitutes means that consumers must
either pay the necessary price for pharmaceuticals or go without them. A
second reason pharmaceuticals create inelastic demand is that they serve a
limited number of uses.s Generally, consumers purchase a drug only for its
medicinal value. That is, drugs are rarely used for any purpose other than
curing or treating an illness. Because no alternative uses exist for
pharmaceuticals, demand is less sensitive to price changes. Lastly, the existence
of health insurance results in purchasers of pharmaceuticals being disaffected by
276. Retail Drug, supra note 13, at *2 (noting that industry experts foresee no incentive for
drug manufacturer owned PBMs to keep competitive prices).
277. GEMMILL, supra note 261, at 390 (noting that in a situation with elastic demand, larger
receipts would result from lower prices than from higher prices).
278. Id. See also FERGUSON & MAURICE, supra note 261, at 28 (stating that inelastic demand
results in a smaller proportional change in the amount demanded than the proportional change in the
price); PETERSON, supra note 273, at 77 (stating that inelastic demand indicates an unresponsiveness
to price changes by consumers).
279. See, e.g., RosKo & BROYLES, supra note 265, at 63 (noting that data indicate that the
demand for healthcare is inelastic); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 260, at 390 (stating that
"the price elasticity of demand for medical care is inelastic").
280. The degree of substitution between a specific good and other goods is often the most
determinative factor affecting elasticity. PETERSON, supra note 273, at 83. If a product has many
substitutes, the demand will be more elastic. Id. Accordingly, if a product has few substitutes or
has poor substitutes, that product's demand tends to be inelastic. Id. See also FERGUSON &
MAURICE, supra note 261, at 34 (noting that a lack of substitutes for a good always results in a
tendency toward inelasticity). Additionally, products with broad definitions have lower price
elasticity. PETERSON, supra, at 88. The broad definition results in fewer feasible substitutes that
would fit the broad definition and, therefore, lower elasticity. Id.
281. FERGUSON & MAURICE, supra note 261, at 34 (noting that commodities with several
possible uses have greater elasticity because people are willing to buy them for more reasons).
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price increases.a' If an insurance company pays all of or the majority of a
patient's bill, that patient will not be concerned with high prices. Thus, the
insurance coverage insulates consumers from price increases so that they do not
respond by decreasing their demand. 3 Because of these factors, the demand
for pharmaceuticals probably will not decrease when the price increases.
When a parent company and its subsidiary do possess opposite goals and
possess inelastic demand for their product, courts should apply the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine. However, applying the doctrine will not
mean that the companies have automatically violated antitrust laws, or
specifically, section 1 of the Sherman Act. Instead, it will mean that if the
companies agree to use anticompetitive practices, they will potentially be subject
to liability under the Sherman Act. Actual liability will still depend upon proof
that the two companies actually did conspire in restraint of trade, as with any
other companies which are not otherwise affiliated with each other.2 4 This
approach would serve the policy concerns voiced by the majority in
Copperweld. ' Those companies merging for purely economic reasons,
lacking opposing goals that increase the incentive to illegally conspire, would not
be subject to intraenterprise conspiracy. However, drug manufacturers merged
with PBMs, and other similarly merged organizations, will effectively be
deterred from using such practices because they will once again be subject to
antitrust liability. The potential application of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine will ensure that the merged companies use only procompetitive
practices. Thus, economically beneficial mergers may still occur.
B. How an Exception to Copperweld Will Affect the PBM Industry
The potential for antitrust liability should have a positive effect on the PBM
industry. If a drug manufacturer wishes to acquire a PBM, it may, assuming
FTC approval, still do so. Further, as long as such an acquisition occurs for
282. STEVEN R. EASTAUGH, MEDICAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH FINANCE 9 (1981). Often,
when insurance pays for services, doctors are prone to recommend more services. Id. Further, this
situation also causes consumers to demand more services since they will ultimately not be
responsible for payment on the services. Id.
283. Id.
284. Actual proof of a Sherman Act violation is typically analyzed under the Rule of Reason.
See supra note 234. The Rule of Reason generally condemns conduct if the only rational basis for
the conduct's existence is that it will destroy competition. HOVENKAMP, supra note 112, at 248.
285. The Copperweld Court feared that overapplication of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine would deter companies from realizing the potential economic efficiencies that flow from
decentralization. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
However, if the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine is only applied in limited situations where a high
potential for using anticompetitive practices exists, legitimate incorporation of subsidiaries could still
occur.
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purely economic efficiency reasons, the merged companies will have no reason
to fear prosecution for violating the Sherman Act. This is true of a merger
within any industry: the Sherman Act only applies if the merged company
attempts to monopolize or attempts to conspire in restraint of trade. " 6
Conversely, if the drug manufacturer's sole reason for acquiring a PBM is to
gain access to competitors' data and force placement of its drugs on the
formulary,' it will face antitrust charges. The potential liability available via
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine will ensure that PBMs continue to exist
to serve consumers, not simply their parent companies. With the threat of being
charged with a Sherman Act violation, drug manufacturers will not be tempted
to engage in practices which would only increase their profits, while harming
consumers. This potential liability will ensure that PBMs retain their goals of
selecting cost-effective drugs for their formularies. As a result, the needs of
companies wishing to vertically integrate will be balanced with the antitrust law
goals of encouraging competition.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal antitrust statutes exist to protect consumers from the harsh
results of anticompetitive practices.' However, when these statutes are
construed so that some companies are insulated from violations, the statutes
cease to meet their goals of protecting consumers. M Such a situation
currently exists with drug manufacturers that have merged with PBMs.2'
While a PBM's aim should be to serve its subscribers by providing them with
cost-effective pharmaceuticals, a PBM owned by a drug manufacturer may not
be allowed to pursue this aim."' As a result, the current state of the antitrust
statutes fails to protect consumers as Congress intended.
The Supreme Court must, therefore, create an exception to its Copperweld
holding. While the Court was fully justified in wanting to encourage
procompetitive integration among companies, its holding in Copperweld
exceeded the justifications offered in support of it. Rather than focus only on
form, and consider only whether a subsidiary is wholly-owned by its parent
company, the Court must examine the substance of the merged companies'
relationship. An examination of the substance of a drug manufacturer's
286. See supra notes 140-59 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
288. See, e.g., BORIC, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that both Congress and the judiciary believed
that agreeing to eliminate rivals or attacking rivals to drive them out of the market could result in
injuring competition "to the detriment of consumers").
289. See supra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 99-159 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
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relationship with its wholly-owned PBM subsidiary shows that potential
anticompetitive practices threaten the industry. An exception to the Copperweld
holding allowing the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine to be applied will
provide the impetus for these companies to adopt only procompetitive practices
and, therefore, protect consumers.
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